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INTRODUCTION 
During the preceding decade, the Rehnquist Court significantly 
limited Congress’s Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment 
authority over civil rights.  The new trend in judicial oversight first 
appeared in United States v. Lopez, where the Supreme Court invalidated 
a statute because Congress failed to show the law congruently and 
proportionately regulated behavior with a substantial effect on the 
national economy.1  In several cases, the Court relied on this congruency 
test to reduce Congress’s ability to enact civil rights legislation.2  On 
another front, beginning with City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court reduced 
Congress’s ability to enforce Fourteenth Amendment due process and 
equal protection rights.3  Boerne interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment 
to be a responsive, rather than a proactive, federal empowerment.4  This 
 
 1 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561-63 (1995).  Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
language also indicated that the Commerce Clause would henceforth only apply to cases 
involving “economic enterprise.”  Id. at 558-61.  Curiously, during the most recent term, the 
Court deviated from its demand for extensive evidence collection, finding constitutional a 
federal statute that regulated the medical use of marijuana despite the lack of proof that it 
would have any substantial effect on interstate commerce.  Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 
2195, 2197 (2005) (“In assessing the scope of Congress’ Commerce Clause authority, the 
Court need not determine whether respondents’ activities, taken in the aggregate, 
substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only whether a ‘rational basis’ exists for 
so concluding.”); id. at 2221 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 2 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000) (striking down section of 
Violence Against Women Act that created private cause of action against perpetrators of 
gender-motivated violence). 
 3 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997) (finding Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act unconstitutional, in part, because statute was “so out of proportion to a 
supposed remedial or preventative object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or 
designed to prevent unconstitutional behavior”). 
 4 Boerne limited Congress’s Section 5 powers to passing congruent laws for remedying 
state violations of Fourteenth Amendment guarantees.  Id. at 520.  Section 5, the Court held, 
does not empower Congress to “enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right 
is.”  Id. at 519.  The Court reiterated this “responsive” interpretation in several other cases, 
including Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, which limited Congress’s power to extend the 
applicability of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to state actors.  528 U.S. 62, 86 
(2000); see also Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001) (holding 
Congress infringed state sovereign immunity with Americans with Disabilities Act); Fla. 
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Savs. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 634-48 (1999) 
(finding Congress overstepped its authority with provisions of Patent and Plant Variety 
Protection Remedy Clarification Act).  But see Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 511, 533-34 
(2004) (determining Title II of Americans with Disabilities Act, dealing with access to 
courtrooms, to be valid use of Congressional power); Nev. Dep’t Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 
U.S. 721, 728-29 (2003) (holding that Family and Medical Leave Act was proportional and 
congruent statute under Boerne). 
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means Congress cannot “determine what constitutes a constitutional 
violation” in order to secure fundamental rights; it can only prevent 
judicially identified unconstitutional behavior.5  The Court thereafter 
reiterated this remedial interpretation in United States v. Morrison, 
finding that Congress overstepped its Fourteenth Amendment authority 
in enacting a civil cause of action for gender-motivated violence 
committed by private individuals as opposed to state actors.6 
Interestingly, the Rehnquist Court has not similarly reduced 
Congress’s authority under the Thirteenth Amendment, making it an 
alternative source for federal civil rights statutes.  This Article develops 
an approach that sidesteps the Court’s recently placed obstacles to 
national civil rights initiatives.  The Thirteenth Amendment differs from 
the Fourteenth Amendment because it lacks a state action requirement.7  
Similarly, it differs from the Commerce Clause because the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s central concern is liberal equality rather than economic 
transaction.  The Thirteenth Amendment’s framers drew from 
antislavery and abolitionist writers to develop a constitutional provision 
for protecting individual rights essential for the common good of 
citizens. 
Despite its far-reaching purposes, Thirteenth Amendment 
jurisprudence has remained woefully underdeveloped.  The little 
jurisprudence that does exist interprets congressional power broadly.  
The Supreme Court has recognized the Thirteenth Amendment to be far 
more than a provision that emancipated slaves.  Pursuant to Section 2 of 
the Amendment, Congress can enact statutes that prohibit private 
discrimination in housing,8 education,9 and employment.10  Some 
scholars have argued that the Thirteenth Amendment reaches conduct as 
diverse as collective bargaining11 and hate speech.12  In short, the 
 
 5 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519. 
 6 529 U.S. at 627. 
 7 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 8 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968). 
 9 Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 170 (1976). 
 10 Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975); see also Anthony v. BTR 
Auto. Sealing Sys., Inc., 339 F.3d 506 (6th Cir. 2003); Madison v. IBP, Inc., 330 F.3d 1051 (8th 
Cir. 2003); Huckabay v. Moore, 142 F.3d 233, 238 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 11 James G. Pope recently wrote about the labor movement’s decision to base labor 
rights activism on the Commerce Clause instead of the Thirteenth Amendment.  James 
Gray Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the Commerce Clause:  Labor & the Shaping of 
American Constitutional Law, 1921-1957, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 14 (2002) (arguing that 
protections of Wagner Act on labor’s right to bargain collectively was based on same vision 
of freedom as framers of Thirteenth Amendment asserted); see also Lea S. Vandervelde, The 
Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 437, 440 (1989) (“In addition to 
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Amendment grants Congress the power to pass statutes for the 
advancement of a variety of civil liberties. 
The Thirteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to provide for 
individual liberties and the general welfare that the Preamble to the 
Constitution and the Declaration of Independence made national creeds.  
Congress retains the constitutional power to pass laws that protect 
fundamental liberties, although it rarely uses this power.  Congress’s and 
the judiciary’s virtual neglect of the Thirteenth Amendment has not 
lessened its significance.  Indeed, the Rehnquist Court’s recent 
jurisprudence, striking down civil rights legislation, has increased the 
Thirteenth Amendment’s pertinence. 
This Article draws upon the views of the country’s founders, 
nineteenth-century abolitionists, and Radical Republicans to evaluate the 
significance of the Thirteenth Amendment.  It explains how the 
amendment permits Congress to protect persons against arbitrary 
treatment that intrudes on liberty interests.  The American Revolution 
had heralded principles of a coequal citizenry.  Later, the abolitionists 
criticized the disjunction between Revolutionary purposes and 
constitutional protections of slavery.  Radical Republicans then refined 
revolutionary abolitionism and gave Congress the power to regulate 
discriminatory conduct that the original Constitution had left to the 
discretion of each state. 
Part I begins by tracing American Revolutionary analyses on the 
nature of a free citizenry. Revolutionary pamphlets are replete with 
discussions of liberty. The founding ideals of the Revolution were 
manifestly incompatible with slavery, but an enforceable guarantee of 
freedom for all did not gain constitutional recognition until the 
ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment. Even though Revolutionaries 
failed to eliminate the institutional practice of slavery, they left an 
intellectual legacy that the post-Civil War Congress drew from. 
Part II connects abolitionist efforts to end slavery with the 
Revolutionary commitment, made years earlier, to liberal equality.  
Abolitionists interpreted the Preamble and the Declaration as manifestos 
against the institution of slavery.  This understanding relied on the same 
 
purely labor-based concerns, the thirteenth amendment debates reflected themes such as 
racial equality, the importance of access to education, the integrity of families, and the 
natural rights of mankind.”). 
 12 Akhil R. Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendment:  R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 
HARV. L. REV. 124, 156 (1992) (asserting that hate speech is badge of servitude); see also 
Alexander Tsesis, Regulating Intimidating Speech, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 389 (2004) (regarding 
Thirteenth Amendment and regulation of hate speech). 
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natural rights tradition that the country’s founders had invoked.  Part III 
describes how abolitionist thought evolved during the congressional 
debates on the Thirteenth Amendment.  These debates took place at the 
end of the Civil War, in 1864 and 1865, and provide insight into how the 
Amendment’s goal of universal liberty is connected to Revolutionary 
ideals that the Constitution’s framers failed to secure. 
Part IV details Supreme Court precedent on the Thirteenth 
Amendment which recognizes Congress’s authority to pass wide-
ranging laws that prohibit private and public discrimination. While 
Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence has remained intact since the 
Warren and Burger Courts, the Rehnquist Court recently limited 
congressional power to act pursuant to other constitutional provisions.  
Part V explains how the erosion of Fourteenth Amendment and 
Commerce Clause powers, by such cases as United States v. Morrison13 
and United States v. Lopez,14 has increased the pertinence of the Thirteenth 
Amendment.  The article concludes by considering the extent of 
Congress’s enforcement power under the Thirteenth Amendment. 
I. REVOLUTIONARY FERVOR FOR LIBERTY 
The Declaration of Independence and the Preamble to the Constitution 
declare life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness to be innate human 
characteristics.  This was a radical notion in the United States at a time 
when slavery was an established practice in most colonies.  Neither the 
Declaration nor the Preamble, however, granted Congress the power to 
enforce the rights they mentioned.  The liberal equality that many 
colonists envisioned only became an enforceable, national commitment 
in 1865 with the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment. 
To be sure, encouraging signs appeared immediately after the 
Revolution; for instance, northern laws ending slavery seemed, for a 
time, to move the entire country in the direction of abolition.  The 
antislavery temperament of the Revolutionary age, however, did not 
translate into universal or national prohibitions against the institution.  
To the contrary, several constitutional provisions, including the Three-
Fifths Clause, the Importation Clause, and the Fugitive Slave Clause, 
protected slavery.15  The founding documents of the American 
Revolution and their colonial antecedents, nevertheless, were essential to  
 
 
 13 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000). 
 14 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-61 (1995). 
 15 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2; U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8; U.S. CONST. art IV. 
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the framers of the Thirteenth Amendment in determining the 
characteristics of a free citizenry. 
A. Liberty in the Revolutionary Era 
The ideological justification for the American Revolution was 
irreconcilable with the Constitution’s protections of slavery.  
Contemporary political and religious leaders regarded the Revolution as 
a struggle for natural liberties that the British government had 
infringed.16  That justification was incompatible with the exploitation of 
human chattel and the enforcement of slave codes.  For slaves, the 
struggle for freedom was even more urgent than it was for white 
colonists who, like Patrick Henry, preferred death to a life of political 
bondage.17 
Some Revolutionary leaders drew attention to the incongruity between 
American demands for freedom from British rule and their rationales for 
slavery.  Alexander Hamilton, for instance, wrote that “[n]o reason can 
be assigned why one man should exercise any power, or preeminence 
over his fellow creatures more than another; unless they have voluntarily 
 
 16 American revolutionists came from a British tradition that regarded freedom to be a 
natural birthright.  See, e.g., WILLIAM PATTEN, A DISCOURSE DELIVERED AT HALLIFAX IN THE 
COUNTY OF PLYMOUTH, JULY 24TH 1766, at 12 (1766) (“We may from what has been said 
infer, in the first place, that FREEDOM is our natural right, equally with other men.”); 
ARTHUR YOUNG, POLITICAL ESSAYS CONCERNING THE PRESENT STATE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE 
19 (1772) (“Liberty is the natural birthright of mankind; and yet to take a comprehensive 
view of the world, how few enjoy it! What a melancholy reflection is it to think that more 
than nine-tenths of the species should be miserable slaves of despotic tyrants!”).  Laws, the 
Revolutionaries believed, could not take away fundamental rights.  See, e.g., John Adams, A 
Dissertation on the Canon & Feudal Law, in 3 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 445, 449 (Charles F. 
Adams ed., 1851) (“Rights, that cannot be repealed or restrained by human laws — Rights, 
derived from the great Legislator of the universe.”); see also SAMUEL ADAMS, THE RIGHTS OF 
THE COLONISTS:  REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF CORRESPONDENCE TO THE BOSTON TOWN 
MEETING NOV. 20, 1772 (1772), available at http://www.constitution.org/bcp/right_col.htm 
(last visited Apr. 18, 2006). 
Among the natural rights of the Colonists are these:  First, a right to life; 
Secondly, to liberty; Thirdly, to property; together with the right to support and 
defend them in the best manner they can. . . . All men have a right to remain in a 
state of nature as . . . nature of a social compact, necessarily ceded, remains.  All 
positive and civil laws should conform, as far as possible, to the law of natural 
reason and equity. 
Id. 
 17 See 1 WILLIAM W. HENRY, PATRICK HENRY:  LIFE, CORRESPONDENCE & SPEECHES 266 
(1891) (stating in March 23, 1775, “‘Forbid it, Almighty God! I know not what course others 
may take; but as for me,’ . . . ‘give me liberty, or give me death!’”). 
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vested him with it.”18  Thomas Paine, exhibiting a knack for bluntness in 
his first published article, entreated Americans to consider  “[w]ith what 
consistency, or decency they complain so loudly of attempts to enslave 
them, while they hold so many hundred thousands in slavery; and 
annually enslave many thousands more, without any pretence of 
authority, or claim upon them.”19  Even though these sentiments were 
widely shared, chattel slavery would linger for almost a century in 
America after its independence. 
1. Revolutionary Understanding of Political Slavery 
Colonial pamphleteers often used the term “slavery” figuratively in 
their opposition to the British Parliament’s intrusion against individual 
liberties.  While their views on the despotism of slavery and on the boon 
of liberty were applicable to all Americans, many Revolutionaries 
thought only white males possessed natural rights.  This dichotomy was 
based on the prejudice of Revolutionary times.  Despite their disregard 
for the logical consequences of their political philosophy, the founders’ 
views on slavery and liberty help explain the meaning of those terms to 
the Reconstruction Congress, which relied heavily on Revolutionary 
tenets.  The Enforcement Clause of the Thirteenth Amendment was a 
product of the U.S. republican ideology as it emerged during the 
Revolution. 
The Revolutionary generation, at least in its rhetoric, sought to 
organize a free republic.  The Sons of Liberty rallied colonists against 
taxation without representation; Liberty Polls were assembly places; 
Henry embodied the Revolutionary project in his pithy statement “Give 
me liberty or give me death”; and Paine, as historian Eric Foner 
explained, believed America to be “the place where the principle of 
universal freedom could take root.”20  Colonists often wrote they were 
under the British yoke of slavery because they considered it to be so 
incompatible with their aspirations.21 
 
 18 ALEXANDER HAMILTON, A FULL VINDICATION OF THE MEASURES OF THE CONGRESS 5 
(1774). 
 19 Thomas Paine, African Slavery in America, in 1 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 4, 7 
(Moncure D. Conway ed., 1894) (1775). 
 20 See JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, THE VINEYARD OF LIBERTY 23-25 (1982); FORREST 
MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM:  THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 10 
(1985); Eric Foner, The Meaning of Freedom in the Age of Emancipation, 81 J. AM. HIST. 435, 439 
(1994). 
 21 BARRY ALAN SHAIN, THE MYTH OF AMERICAN INDIVIDUALISM:  THE PROTESTANT 
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 289-91 (1994). 
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Slavery symbolized the political oppressions from which colonists 
demanded relief.  The meaning of “slavery” that Reconstructionists 
derived from the founders’ writings was “being wholly under the power 
and controul of another, as to our actions and properties.”22  The 
opposite of being in servitude, defined by Richard Price in a work that 
enjoyed widespread popularity, was to be guided by one’s will.23 
The political conception of slavery appeared in colonial writings as 
early as the 1740s.  An anonymous author of that decade contrasted the 
natural liberty of action and thought with the slavery of arbitrary 
power.24  This contrast also appeared in the pamphlets that were printed 
during the War of Independence.  One polemicist contrasted the felicity 
of liberty with the debasement of slavery, which “discourages industry, 
frugality, and every thing praise-worthy; introduces ignorance and 
poverty, with the most sordid vices, and universal misery.”25  Men who 
are deprived of their liberty, preached Gad Hitchcock, are debased to the 
“primitive standard of humanity,” becoming stupid, indolent, and 
indifferent to improvement.26  Despite the public outcry against the 
arbitrary use of British power, colonists committed even worse 
oppressions against their slaves.27 
 
 22 MOSES MATHER, AMERICA’S APPEAL TO THE IMPARTIAL WORLD 48 (1775). 
 23 Richard Price, Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty, in THE GENERAL 
INTRODUCTION TO THE TWO TRACTS ON CIVIL LIBERTY, THE WAR WITH AMERICA, AND THE 
FINANCES OF THE KINGDOM 11 (1778) (“In general to be free is to be guided by one’s own 
will; and to be guided by the will of another is the characteristic of Servitude.”). 
 24 See N.Y. EVENING POST, Nov. 16, 1747 (“Liberty is a natural Power of doing, or not 
doing, whatever we have a Mind . . . .  Slavery is a force put upon human Nature, by which 
a Man is obliged to act, or not to act, according to the arbitrary will and Pleasure of 
another.”). 
 25 JUDAH CHAMPION, CHRISTIAN & CIVIL LIBERTY & FREEDOM CONSIDERED & 
RECOMMENDED:  A SERMON DELIVERED BEFORE THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE COLONY OF 
CONNECTICUT, AT HARTFORD, ON THE DAY OF THEIR ANNIVERSARY ELECTION, MAY 9TH, 
1776, at 14 (1776). 
 26 GAD HITCHCOCK, A SERMON PREACHED AT PLYMOUTH DECEMBER 22, 1774, at 17 
(1775). 
 27 The American Anti-Slavery Society’s Declaration, which the society drafted on 
December 4, 1833, pointed out the discrepancy between what the white colonists and black 
colonists achieved through the revolution: 
We have met together for the achievement of an enterprise, without which, that 
of our fathers is incomplete . . . .  Their grievances, great as they were, were 
trifling in comparison with the wrongs and sufferings of those for whom we 
plead.  Our fathers were never slaves — never bought and sold like cattle — 
never shut out from the light of knowledge and religion — never subjected to the 
lash of brutal task-masters. 
DECLARATION OF SENTIMENTS OF THE AMERICAN ANTI-SLAVERY SOCIETY 1 (1833). 
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Most pamphleteers were concerned with ending the slavery of 
parliamentary encroachment on colonial rights rather than the slavery 
that colonists practiced.  Revolutionary sermonizers and political writers, 
during the 1760s and 1770s, decried several British parliamentary laws as 
attempts to enslave the colonists.  A clergyman who gave a sermon at 
Billerica, Massachusetts, soon after the Stamp Act was repealed in 1766, 
spoke of the heavens recovering “their wonted serenity, . . . [and] 
reviving liberty, . . . . with heightened lustre and beauty” while slavery 
“vanishes out of sight.”28  Joseph Emerson also rejoiced about the repeal 
of the Stamp Act that had placed the colonists into “vile ignominious 
slavery.”29 
Others also viewed the use of these parliamentary measures as 
absolutist attempts at their enslavement.30  The Townshend Revenue Act 
of 1767, which imposed duties on a variety of items, including tea and 
paper, was widely condemned because it tended to reduce Americans to 
slavery.31  “For what slavery can be more compleat,” rhetorically asked a 
Philadelphia Grand Jury, “more miserable, more disgraceful, than that 
lot of a people” that was governed by laws not of their own making.32  
John Dickinson, who became a central figure in the Continental 
Congress, wrote in a similar fashion that persons who were taxed 
without their consent were in “a state of the most abject slavery.”33  The 
same year, Silas Downer, the corresponding secretary of the Sons of 
Liberty for Rhode Island, denounced taxation without Americans’ 
consent to be the “the lowest bottom of slavery.”34  The Tea Act, through 
 
 28 HENRY CUMINGS, A THANKSGIVING SERMON PREACHED AT BILLERICA, NOVEMBER 27, 
1766, at 21 (1767); see also ELISHA FISH, JOY AND GLADNESS:  A THANKSGIVING DISCOURSE . . . 
OCCASIONED BY THE REPEAL OF THE STAMP-ACT 10 (1767) (“Surely we have not so soon 
forgot the dark day, when the Sun of our Liberty set in a gloomy cloud, which, for a season, 
boded perpetual night.”). 
 29 JOSEPH EMERSON, THANKSGIVING ON THE ACCOUNT OF THE REPEAL OF THE STAMP-
ACT 9 (1766). 
 30 THE SPEECHES OF HIS EXCELLENCY GOVERNOR HUTCHINSON, TO THE GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY OF THE MASSACHUSETTS-BAY.  AT A SESSION BEGUN AND HELD ON THE SIXTH OF 
JANUARY, 1773, at 34, 44 (1773) (“[T]he Minds of the People were filled with Anxiety, and 
they were justly alarmed with Apprehensions of the total Extinction of their Liberties . . . .  
[N]othing is more evident, than that any People who are subject to the unlimited Power of 
another, must be in a State of abject Slavery.”). 
 31 Townshend Revenue Act, 1767, 7 Geo. 3 (Eng.). 
 32 Philadelphia Grand Jury (Sept. 30 1770), BOSTON EVENING-POST, Nov. 5, 1770, at 4. 
 33 JOHN DICKINSON, LETTERS FROM A FARMER IN PENNSYLVANIA, TO THE INHABITANTS OF 
THE BRITISH COLONIES 53 (1768).  Dickinson believed that politically unrepresented persons 
were slaves, and since the colonists had been taxed without their consent, they had, in 
effect, been enslaved.  Id. at 38. 
 34 SILAS DOWNER, A DISCOURSE, DELIVERED IN PROVIDENCE, IN THE COLONY OF RHODE-
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which Parliament imposed the tax on tea that spurred the Boston Tea 
Party in December 1773, was viewed as the “[e]nsign of their arbitrary 
Dominion and your Slavery.”35  In dramatic fashion, Josiah Quincy 
proclaimed that “We are slaves!” of the British oppressors.36  The 
implication, as another pamphleteer remarked, was that persons who 
were not treated as “subjects” — or “citizens,” in modern terminology — 
were slaves.37  The use of absolute parliamentary power, Hamilton wryly 
remarked, resulted in colonial slavery.38  The analogy was not lost on 
common folk.  A private in the army wrote in a letter to his parents on 
July 4, 1777 that colonial courage and conduct would “determine wether 
Americans are to be free men or slaves.”39  These were tragically 
paradoxical phrases given that hereditary slavery was then legal in all 
the colonies. 
2. Colonial Statements Against Chattel Slavery 
Despite the extensive spread of slavery, many colonial poemicists 
decried it.  The blindness to colonial oppressions astonished one 
observer and prompted him to ask how “Men who feel the Value and 
Importance of Liberty as much as the In habitants of the southern States 
do that of their own, should keep such Numbers of the human Species in 
a State of so absolute Vassalage.”40  The Reconstruction would later try to 
reclaim the initial disgust with arbitrary oppression without the classist 
contradictions that had accompanied the drive for independence.  The 
Radical Republicans, who gave the Thirteenth Amendment momentum 
for ratification, were raised in a tradition marked by a narrowly 
construed form of antislavery that waxed in the years leading up to the 
Revolution.  One Harvard-educated Congregational minister, Nathaniel 
Appleton, concluded that the colonial protest in 1765 against the Stamp 
Act and its ultimate repeal would have been more glorious “if at the time 
 
ISLAND, UPON THE 25TH DAY OF JULY, 1768. AT THE DEDICATION OF THE TREE OF LIBERTY, 
FROM THE SUMMER HOUSE IN THE TREE 10 (1768). 
 35 HAMPDEN, THE ALARM (NO. III) (1773). 
 36 JOSIAH QUINCY, JR., OBSERVATIONS ON THE ACT OF PARLIAMENT COMMONLY CALLED 
THE BOSTON PORT-BILL 69 (1774). 
 37 ARGUMENT IN DEFENCE OF THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT CLAIMED BY THE COLONIES TO TAX 
THEMSELVES (1774), quoted in JOHN P. REID, THE CONCEPT OF LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 49 (1988). 
 38 ALEXANDER HAMILTON, A FULL VINDICATION OF THE MEASURES OF CONGRESS 4 
(1774). 
 39 PHILIP DAVIDSON, PROPAGANDA AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1763-1783, at 341 
(1941). 
 40 Ebenezer Hazard’s Travels Through Maryland in 1777, 46 MD. HIST. MAG. 44, 50 (1951). 
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we are establishing Liberty for ourselves and children, we show the 
same regard to all mankind that come among us.”41 
Literature of this sort illustrates the shift in the colonial conscience 
during the 1760s and 1770s from an almost universal complacency about 
slavery to a widespread antagonism toward the institution.42  Most of the 
North gradually came to understand the incongruity between racial 
slavery and the battle with England to secure colonists’ natural and civil 
liberties, and by 1830, only 2780 blacks remained enslaved in northern 
states.43  In spite of this awareness, an Amendment abolishing slavery 
was necessary because during the Revolutionary War, most white 
founders advocated freedom only for those of their own propertied 
class.44  Revolutionary liberals, as the renowned historian David Brion 
Davis pointed out, “may well have agreed that Negro slavery had no 
place in a free society.  But their domestic views, like those of the 
majority of patriot lawyers and political leaders, were moderated by a 
concern for public order, for property rights, and for southern 
sensibilities.”45 
The country’s founders’ definition of tyrannical oppression was 
unmistakably applicable to chattel slavery, but until 1865 there was no 
national consensus to end institutionalized bondage.  The outcry about 
blacks’ enslavement came from some of the most politically active and 
wealthy men in the colonies.  Some of them realized the Revolution’s 
ideological implications for involuntary servitude.  John Mein, a British 
Loyalist, pointed out the disingenuousness of Bostonians who grounded 
their struggle in the immutable laws of nature, while they lived in a 
town with 2000 black slaves.46  The evident contradiction also evoked a 
response from Samuel Johnson, an English lexicographer and opponent 
of colonial independence.  As he saw it, the “loudest yelps for liberty” 
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were heard from “drivers of Negroes.”47 
During the struggle with England, an increasing number of pamphlets 
denounced the inconsistency of retaining the institution of slavery with 
the battle for the Rights of Man.  Benjamin Rush, a physician with many 
political interests, wrote that “it would be useless for us to denounce the 
servitude to which the Parliament of Great Britain wishes to reduce us, 
while we continue to keep our fellow creatures in slavery just because 
their color is different from ours.”48  England would not accept the force 
of Revolutionary reasoning, wrote another author in 1774, until 
Americans ended the cruelty of slavery.49  John Allen, who lacked Rush’s 
political ambitions, denounced slaveholders in even stronger terms, 
calling them “trifling patriots” and “pretended votaries for Freedom” 
who trampled on the natural rights and privileges of Africans while they 
made a “vain parade of being advocates of the liberties of mankind.”50  
He further pointed out that a duty on tea was of far smaller consequence 
than the bondage of a captive.51 
Religious leaders, just as their secular counterparts, drew attention to 
the need for moral reform.  Samuel Hopkins’s heart-wrenching plea on 
behalf of blacks asserted that Americans were enslaving many thousands 
of their “brethren, who have as good a right to liberty as ourselves.”52  
The miserable oppressions of slavery, complained Hopkins, were 
contrary to the colonists’ plea of liberty and violated religious morality 
as well as the precepts of humanity and charity.53  In 1774, Reverend 
Nathaniel Niles of Newbury, Massachusetts, pointed out Americans’ 
shame in struggling for their freedom while continuing “to enslave their 
fellow men.”54  Clergyman Appleton asked the “sons of liberty” to 
recognize that their principles did not comport with their participation in 
the slave trade.55  If they persisted in this confounding callousness, 
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Appleton warned, mankind would laugh at their pretensions.56 
The most far-sighted of the religious opponents of slavery was the 
Quaker Anthony Benezet.  He not only dispelled the notion that slavery 
was a benevolent institution,57 but further reflected on how to free those 
Africans who had been enslaved.  He realized that without receiving 
some aid after their liberation, former slaves would be unable to compete 
with other free persons.  Therefore, he recommended that both adults 
and children receive adequate instructions for becoming productive 
members of their communities.58  Seeking to calm the whites’ fears about 
free blacks, Benezet explained how liberation would help government 
achieve security and welfare:  the tax burden would decrease because the 
obligation to pay taxes would fall on everyone, the trades and arts would 
advance, and productivity would increase since more vacant land would 
be cultivated.59  Abolition, therefore, would benefit the general welfare.  
Liberation meant much more than just ending obligatory labor; it 
required colonists to grant blacks the opportunity to participate in the 
privileges of equal citizenship. 
Some black contemporaries also were quick to seize on the egalitarian 
significance of Revolutionary thought to bolster their demand for 
freedom.  A group of black New Hampshire petitioners used natural 
rights terminology to make their point “[t]hat freedom is an inherent 
right of the human species . . . [and] [t]hat private or public tyranny and 
slavery are alike detestable.”60  Similarly, on April 20, 1773, black 
petitioners from Massachusetts expressed their hope for “great things 
from men who have made such a noble stand against the designs of their 
fellow-men to enslave them.”61  The same year, in another petition, blacks 
from Boston and other Massachusetts provinces demanded relief from 
the manifold burdens of New England slavery:  “We have no Property!  
We have no Wives!  No Children!  We have no City!  No Country.”62  
Lemuel Haynes, a racially mixed minister, wrote that “an African, or, in 
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other terms, . . . a Negro, . . . has an undeniable right to his Liberty.”63  A 
“Great Number of Blackes detained in the State of slavery” petitioned 
the Massachusetts Assembly in 1777.64  They requested that the 
Massachusetts Assembly 
give this petition its due weight & consideration & cause an act of 
the Legislatur to be past Wherby they may be Restored to the 
Enjoyments of that which is the Naturel Right of all men — and 
their Children who wher Born in this Land of Liberty may not be 
heald as Slaves after they arive at the age of twenty one years so 
may the Inhabitance of this State No longer chargeable with the 
inconsistancy of acting themselves the part which they condem and 
oppose in others Be prospered in their present Glorious struggle for 
Liberty and have those Blessing to them.65 
In Massachusetts, where slaves were regarded as both property and 
persons, blacks brought freedom suits against their masters.66  During the 
decade before the Revolution, several litigants were successful in 
petitioning Massachusetts courts to grant them freedom.67  Slavery’s 
death knell came in 1783 from the Massachusetts Supreme Court, which 
interpreted the state’s constitution to prohibit the institution.68 
Even the southern vanguard of the Revolution realized the anomaly 
between liberty’s cause and the inequitable institution Southerners chose 
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to perpetuate after independence.  Patrick Henry, for one, acknowledged 
his hypocrisy.  After scrutinizing one of Benezet’s abolitionist tracts, 
Henry wrote: 
[I]s it not amazing, that at a time when the rights of Humanity are 
defined & understood with precision in a Country above all others 
fond of Liberty:  that in such an Age and such a Country, we find 
Men, professing a Religion the most humane, mild, meek, gentle & 
generous, adopting a Principle as repugnant to humanity. . . .  
Would any one believe that I am Master of Slaves of my own 
purchase!  I am drawn along by ye general Inconvenience of living 
without them; I will not, I cannot justify it. . . .  I believe a time will 
come when an oppertunity will be offered to abolish this lamentable 
Evil.69 
Little could Henry know that the “lamentable Evil” would only be 
abolished after a bloody civil war.  Thomas Jefferson also realized how 
incongruous slavery was in the age of revolution. Jefferson, indeed, had 
some premonition about the national catastrophe that slavery could 
create, believing that it would destroy the morals of the people.70  The 
need for a federal union and the widely held belief in the inferiority of 
blacks and American Indians paved the way for a national compromise 
that kept slavery intact after the Revolution and set the country on a path 
to war against itself. 
American antislavery literature of the eighteenth century relied on 
universalistic principles of natural law to make its case against granting 
slaveholders legal concessions.  It rejected racialist biological views, 
which regarded blacks as less evolutionarily developed than whites.71  
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Blacks and whites, wrote Benezet, are of the same species; therefore, they 
are on a naturally equal footing.72  “Hereditary tyrants,” stated an 
anonymous pamphlet from 1784, place whites on a pedestal with gods, 
while they degrade another part of humanity and treat them like 
brutes.73  Before his nervous breakdown in 1764, James Otis asserted that 
all colonists, both white and black, were born naturally free.74  He viewed 
the institution of slavery as a despoiler of civilization that prefers the 
interests of petty tyrants to the value of liberty.75  Citizens were of white, 
brown, and black complexion, on all of whom the sun rose daily.76  The 
commerce in humans was against nature, wrote Abraham Booth, 
because everyone, whether African or European, has an “equal claim to 
personal liberty with any man upon earth.”77  Everyone, therefore, has a 
common stock of human rights.78  Individual colonists, like General 
William Whipple, who served the nation from Portsmouth, New 
Hampshire, acted on the logic of natural rights.  In 1777, Whipple’s slave 
said:  “[Y]ou are going to fight for your liberty, but I have none to fight 
for.”79  These words cut Whipple to the quick, and he immediately freed 
the slave.80 
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Given the extent of ideological commitment to universal liberty, many 
Revolutionaries thought that the demise of slavery was near at hand.  
Historian Winthrop D. Jordan has pointed out that in the years 
preceding the Revolution, a general impression prevailed that slavery 
was a “communal sin.”81  Benjamin Rush noticed this tendency in a letter 
to Granville Sharp, a British abolitionist.  “The cause of African freedom 
in America,” Rush wrote in 1774, “continues to gain ground.”82  He 
expected slavery in America to end within forty years.83  That view, 
however, wound up being overly optimistic.  Another ninety years and 
the Civil War would intervene before the Thirteenth Amendment’s 
ratification. 
B. Failure to Enforce the Ideology of Liberty 
In spite of the widespread realization that slavery contradicted the 
Constitution’s founders’ moral stance against England, abolition was 
long in coming.  This was, in large part, because many colonialists were 
unwilling to place human rights above economic self-interest and to 
overcome, or even to adequately confront, their own racial prejudices.  
Thomas Jefferson’s experience typifies the loss of liberal idealism.  
Writing during the heyday of idealistic American expectations, Jefferson 
had wanted to end the importation of slaves into the colonies and follow 
that with the “abolition of domestic slavery.”84  His original draft of the 
Declaration of Independence accused King George of acting “against 
human nature itself” by keeping open an international slave trade, which 
violated the “rights of life and liberty of persons of a distant people.”85  
That same year, in 1776, Jefferson’s second and third drafts of the 
Virginia Constitution contained a provision that “[n]o person hereafter 
coming into this country shall be held in slavery under any pretext 
whatever.”86 
In 1776, when Jefferson had actively worked to end slave importation, 
most colonial leaders were unwilling to go that far.  South Carolina, 
which would later repeatedly appear as a leader of the antebellum 
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proslavery camp, expressed its opposition to a passage denouncing slave 
importation in the original draft of the Declaration, and the passage was 
not retained in the Declaration’s final draft.87  Thirty-eight years after 
independence, however, Jefferson had become complacent toward the 
oppression that, by then, only a constitutional amendment could 
eliminate.  In 1814, writing to Edward Coles, who later became the 
antislavery governor of Illinois, Jefferson acknowledged that “the flame 
of liberty” that he had hoped would kindle in the younger generation, 
leading to a popular movement against slavery, had not combusted.88  
Despite his avowed disappointment at this Revolutionary failing, 
Jefferson counseled Coles not to liberate his slaves.89 
Even without the proposed anti-importation passage, the Declaration 
of Independence established liberty as a primary national aspiration.90  In 
the decades between the ratification of the country’s founding 
documents and the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, the 
Declaration’s universal guarantee of freedom posed a moral dilemma to 
politicians and citizens who tolerated and participated in an institution 
contrary to core national commitments.  Its terms created for the 
founding generation the rhetorical dilemma of denying to persons of 
African descent the universal right of freedom.91 
Legal restrictions on the lives of slaves indicated how constricted the 
definitions of “liberty” and “equality” were to many colonists, especially 
Southerners.  Slave codes regulated everything from matrimony and 
travel to living arrangements and the use of leisure time.92  While the 
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theoretical referent of liberty was expansive for Revolutionaries, in 
practical terms it meant little for those who were enslaved.  The 
philosophical principles on which the Revolution relied brought the 
despotism of American slavery into sharp relief. 
Before the Revolution, slavery was legal in all thirteen colonies.93  The 
nation’s principled developments during the Revolutionary Period 
enervated antislavery sentiments in the North, where colonies ended the 
institution through legislative and judicial efforts.  Pragmatism played a 
role, since it was easier to abolish the institution in the North, where 
ending slavery had little economic repercussion on the labor force, than 
in the South, where all manner of agricultural and commercial 
enterprises were dependent on it.  The end of slavery in the North was 
nevertheless a decisive and lasting change born of authentic 
Revolutionary commitments to liberty. 
In 1774, the Continental Congress required that the importation of 
slaves cease after December 1, 1775.94  But the limited power that the 
colonies had granted to the Continental Congress made the body 
incapable of enforcing its decree.95  As W. E. B. DuBois pointed out, the 
philosophy of freedom was one among several reasons for ending slave 
importation.96  The 1787 Northwest Ordinance, though imperfect, was 
another nationwide effort against the spread of slavery to the West.97  
 
IN THE NORTH 12-24 (1967); id. at 86-87 (matrimony); id. at 170 (matrimony); 26 ARCHIVES OF 
MARYLAND 259-60 (William H. Browne ed., 1906) (matrimony); STATUTES AT LARGE:  BEING 
A COLLECTION OF ALL LAWS OF VIRGINIA (William W. Hening, ed., 1823) (matrimony); 4 
THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA 62-63 (1897) (matrimony); 7 THE STATUTES AT 
LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 352, 352-53, 363 (David J. McCord ed., 1840) (leisure). 
 93 Eric Foner, Expert Report, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 311, 313 (1999). 
 94 William P. Quigley, Reluctant Charity:  Poor Laws in the Original Thirteenth States, 31 
U. RICH. L. REV. 111, 172 n.401 (1997). 
 95 Michael Daly Hawkins, John Quincy Adams in the Antebellum Maritime Slave Trade:  
The Politics of Slavery and the Slavery of Politics, 25 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 1, 5 (2000). 
 96 W. E. B. DUBOIS, THE SUPPRESSION OF THE AFRICAN SLAVE-TRADE TO THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA, 1638-1870, at 41-42 (1896) (noting other important reasons were fear of 
slave insurrections, slave breeders’ monopolistic calculations, and strategy of harming 
British commerce). 
 97 Whatever good came from the Ordinance’s prohibition of slavery, which applied to 
lands northwest of the Ohio River, was counterbalanced by an ominous fugitive slave 
clause: 
There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said Territory, 
otherwise than in the punishment of crimes whereof the party shall have been 
duly convicted:  Provided, always, that any person escaping into the same, from 
whom labor or service is lawfully claimed in any one of the original States, such 
fugitive may be lawfully reclaimed and conveyed to the person claiming his or 
her labor or services as aforesaid. 
  
2006] A Civil Rights Approach 1793 
The Ordinance applied to an area that would include present-day Ohio, 
Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin.98 
Individual states in the North were also moving to end slavery within 
their borders.  Rhode Island, in 1774, restricted the slave trade, prefacing 
its new law with the statement that “those who are desirous of enjoying 
all the advantages of liberty themselves, should be willing to extend 
personal liberty to others.”99  That assertion was only partly sincere since 
the state allowed slave traders not able to dispose of their cargo in the 
West Indies to bring it to Rhode Island as long as it was re-exported it 
within a year.100  Connecticut, that same year, passed “[a]n Act 
prohibiting slave importation,”101 and Delaware (1776), Virginia (1778), 
and Maryland (1783) followed suit.102  As for South Carolina (1787) and 
North Carolina (1786), those two states made importation more difficult 
but showed no fundamental aversion to it.103 
An even more important step toward total abolition was the North’s 
decision to end slavery pursuant to core revolutionary commitments.  
The 1777 Vermont Constitution outlawed slavery.104  It explicitly 
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recognizes that “all men are born equally free and independent, and 
have certain natural, inherent and unalienable rights, amongst which are 
the enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing and 
protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and 
safety.”105  The New Hampshire Bill of Rights seems to have been the 
primary legal means of ending slavery in 1784.106  It provides that the 
natural rights to life, liberty, and property “shall not be denied or 
abridged by this state on account of race, creed, color, sex or national 
origin.”107  In Massachusetts, Chief Justice William Cushing for the 
Superior Court decreed slavery to be unconstitutional and against 
principles of natural rights.108  He considered all men to be born free and 
equal.109  These states’commitments made tangible the principles of the 
Declaration of Independence. 
Nevertheless, Slavery lingered in some northern states.  A gradual 
abolition law went into effect in Pennsylvania in 1780.110  Benezet, who 
lived to see its passage, could claim no more than partial success for his 
years of effort to achieve immediate emancipation.  Rhode Island and 
Connecticut enacted similar laws in 1784, New York in 1799, and New 
Jersey in 1804.111  New York and New Jersey took the extra step of 
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providing for the support of abandoned slave children.112  Gradualism 
aimed at minimal intrusion on present owners property rights while 
granting no immediate reprieve from a reprehensible practice. 
The closest thing to abolition in the South, though woefully short of 
Revolutionary aims, came during the 1780s and 1790s when Virginia, 
Maryland, and Delaware relaxed laws allowing masters to free slaves as 
long as the former were willing to vouch that the latter would not 
become public wards.113  Those laws provided for the support of freed 
people.  The newly freed slaves emerged from a lowly state without 
compensation for their years of labor and with few opportunities, still 
political slaves in a culture committed to keeping them out of power.114  
Blacks who gained prominence, like portrait painter Joshua Johnston or 
poet Phillis Wheatley, overcame immense roadblocks.115 
Changes to state laws did not alter the national situation.  The 
federalist nature of the Union made it possible for southern states to 
bolster slavery, especially because constitutional compromises 
diminished federal power to stunt growth of the “peculiar institution.” 
C. Constitutional Failings 
Despite the public outcry against slavery, the Constitutional 
Convention of 1787 drafted an instrument that was more congenial to the 
economic interests of southern states than it was principled.  The 
Constitution’s founders thereby secured the Union, but at the cost of 
continuing the organized tyranny of chattel servitude.  Their 
commitment to the protection of personal property overshadowed their 
disdain for slavery.  The drafters of the Constitution created an 
instrument whose propertied biases would later catapult the nation into 
a civil war that would make clear the divisiveness and incompatibility of 
slavery with a constitutional republic.116 
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South Carolina and Georgia delegates at the 1787 Convention 
demanded that the Constitution include protections for slavery.117  
Gaining their votes came at the cost of casting aside the Declaration of 
Independence’s universal values and nationally recognizing slavery as a 
form of property.  The Constitution’s protections for the institution 
created a rift concerning slavery that would lead the country into 
numerous internal conflicts.118  Even those northern and upper southern 
delegates who had sought immediate cessation of the slave trade gave in 
to the Deep South’s demands. 
To their credit, the Constitution’s founders provided avenues for 
formal political change, including a method for amending the 
Constitution with Article V.  Radical Republicans would later use Article 
V to nullify the proslavery sections through the Thirteenth Amendment.  
However, the founders did little to alter the oligarchic social relations of 
their own time, granting a disproportionate amount of power to 
slaveholders, rather than immediately producing the representative 
democracy that the Declaration heralded.119 
The constitutional protections of slavery compromised Revolutionary 
aspirations for freedom to such a degree, requiring a change greater than 
the simple abolition of physical bondage and forced labor.  The 
Thirteenth Amendment meant to grant Congress the power to end all 
civil conditions related to slavery.  Known as the Abolition Amendment, 
it liberated the entire Constitution.  It rendered all clauses directly 
dealing with slavery null and altered the meaning of other clauses, such 
as the Insurrection Clause, to exclude their original design.  The 
Thirteenth Amendment also relied on the abolitionist conviction that the 
Declaration of Independence guaranteed universal human rights to 
citizens, regardless of their race. 
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II. ABOLITIONIST INFLUENCES 
Those abolitionists who called for the immediate end to chattel slavery 
traced their notions of liberty to Revolutionary ideology on fundamental 
rights.  Drawing their ideas from Revolutionaries like Benjamin Rush 
and James Otis, abolitionists argued that blacks deserved the same 
privileges and immunities as any other Americans.  As early as 1833, at 
the inception of the radical abolitionist movement, the American Anti-
Slavery Society announced its affinity for the founders’ ideals but 
renounced their political enterprise because of the concessions to 
slavery.120  The Society considered the grievances of constitutional fathers 
against Britain to be trifling when compared to the plaints of slaves.121 
Abolitionists, just as the Thirteenth Amendment founders who 
followed them, conceived their campaign against slavery to derive from 
the colonial struggle for independence.  William Lloyd Garrison, a 
prolific radical abolitionist,122 regarded immediate abolition to be implicit 
in the self-evident truths of the Declaration of Independence.123  He and 
other nineteenth-century abolitionists, the “Garrisonians,” relied on the 
Declaration in developing a republican agenda of national reform. 
The exploitation of slaves, as the Garrisonians saw it, violated 
Congress’s obligation under the General Welfare Clause to act for the 
betterment of all U.S. citizens.124  Slavery, so ran this rather utilitarian 
argument, violated the Preamble’s declared purpose of promoting the 
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general welfare and securing the blessings of liberty.125  The national 
government violated its constitutional obligation to institute impartial 
laws for the general welfare by its failure to stop the exploitation of 
hundreds of thousands of laborers.  Radical abolitionists recognized that 
the nation’s founders had “separated from the mother country” and had 
declared independence in order to resist “the attempt of Great Britain to 
impose on them a political slavery.”126  Slavery was incompatible with 
the goals of the Revolution as the founders expressed them in the 
Declaration. 
Many abolitionists regarded the Declaration as a statement of 
congressional obligation to protect natural rights against arbitrary 
exploitation.  The abolitionists adopted the creed that natural rights were 
intrinsic to citizenship.  Citizenship to them was the birthright of 
everyone born in the United States.127  Their political rhetoric extolled the 
American project to protect human rights.  Natural rights, argued 
numerous abolitionist publications, are intrinsic to individuals and 
precede society.  Civil societies, explained Unitarian abolitionist William 
E. Channing, are organized to protect those rights.128 
Many members of the Reconstruction Congress later expressed a 
similar perspective of fundamental rights during debates on the 
proposed Thirteenth Amendment.129  Slavery was the deprivation of 
those rights, and following the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, 
Congress could provide redress against intrusions on civil liberties.   
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Reconstructionists based their understanding of freedom, in large part, 
on abolitionist views. 
For the Reconstruction Congress, as for abolitionists, slavery was the 
worst of all robberies because it misappropriated people’s toils, talents, 
and strengths.130  Not only did it infringe on slaves’ vocational choices, 
but it also deprived them of their rights to transit, fair trial, and bodily 
integrity.131  The right to own and alienate property was likewise 
essential to human happiness, but it was denied to the enslaved.132  
Slavery also prevented people in bondage from entering into binding 
agreements.  According to some antislavery advocates, such as Lysander 
Spooner, even without an abolition amendment, the Contract Clause of 
the original Constitution prohibited states from passing slave codes 
because they infringed on the natural right to contract.133 
Slavery withheld inalienable rights, which are common to all 
persons.134  Theodore Parker and other abolitionist authors located the 
right to live a free and happy life in the Declaration of Independence and 
in the Preamble.135  These documents guaranteed that right and any 
complementary inalienable rights equally for all, regardless of race.136  
The national government’s obligation to abolish slavery required it to 
pass laws providing for an equality of “civil and political rights and 
privileges.”137 
The existence of a U.S. covenant to protect equal rights was thus 
quintessential to the abolitionist understanding of national government.  
The Declaration was especially the cornerstone of the “temple of 
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freedom” for which “[a]t the sound of their trumpet-call, three millions 
of people rose up as from the sleep of death, and rushed to the strife of 
blood; deeming it more glorious to die instantly as freemen, than 
desirable to live an hour as slaves.”138  When the Revolutionary 
generation denied to Great Britain the right and power to violate the 
colonists’ privilege to enjoy their natural rights, that generation, 
according to constitutional attorney Joel Tiffany, prohibited the newly 
formed U.S. government from countenancing enslavement.139 
To radical constitutionalists, who disagreed with the Garrisonian 
abolitionist indictment of the original Constitution, it appeared that 
some constitutional provisions did prohibit slavery.  Primarily, they 
relied on the Guarantee Clause to assert the United States’s obligation to 
protect the life, liberty, and property of all persons born within any 
state.140  For them, a government that countenanced slavery succumbed 
to an oligarchy of arbitrary disenfranchisement and enslavement, neither 
of which was consistent with a republican form of government.141  The 
social order of owning slaves was incompatible with a polity committed 
to the protection of civil liberties through representation.  Slavery was 
analogous to the despotism against which the colonies rebelled, and it 
was conducive to a concentration of power harmful to basic liberties.142  
Crucially, however, abolitionist belief that the Declaration was a 
fundamental law of the United States overlooked that document’s lack of 
an enforcement provision.143  The Enforcement Clause of the Thirteenth 
Amendment would eventually fill that deficiency. 
III. THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT CONGRESSIONAL EXPOSITION 
The framers of the Thirteenth Amendment adopted abolitionist ideas 
on the universality of fundamental rights and made them 
constitutionally viable.  The Thirty-Eighth Congress, which framed the 
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terms of the Amendment, meant to enforce the Declaration of 
Independence’s statement of equal liberty and to provide for the general 
welfare promised under the Preamble to the Constitution.  The 
Amendment gave Congress the power, through the Enforcement Clause, 
to pass national laws in furtherance of civil rights.  This approach 
increased federal authority over acts of discrimination.  The Amendment 
was a radical break from the antebellum deference to states in matters of 
group relations. 
A. On the Coattails of the Declaration of Independence and Abolition 
Abolitionists deeply influenced the thinking of Republican 
Reconstructionists.  Several of the principal congressional leaders during 
the Thirteenth Amendment debates had long been committed to 
abolitionism.  Representative Thaddeus Stevens, for one, had actively 
participated in abolitionism since his early years.  As an attorney, he 
represented fugitive slaves for no fee.  In 1849, at age fifty-seven, he 
entered politics in response to the agitation over slavery after the cession 
of Mexican lands.144  Stevens was the chairman of the powerful 
Committee on the Ways and Means during the debates on the Thirteenth 
Amendment and, later, of the Committee on Appropriations during the 
debates on the Civil Rights Act of 1866.145 
Senator Charles Sumner was another early convert to abolitionism.  
Sumner’s convictions against slavery were born of his experience with its 
unyielding practices and ideology.  He had been a dedicated abolitionist 
since 1835, when he first subscribed to Garrison’s Liberator.146  Sumner 
was the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations throughout the 
debates on the Thirteenth Amendment and on the Civil Rights Act of 
1866.147 
Both Stevens and Sumner brought the Revolutionary natural rights 
tradition to the debates on the Thirteenth Amendment and made those 
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principles a part of the Constitution.148  Sumner’s arguments against 
passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Bill were representative of the ideas he 
continued to champion during the debates on the Thirteenth 
Amendment.149  “Slavery,” he stated in one speech, “is an infraction of 
the immutable law of nature, and, as such, cannot be considered a 
natural incident to any sovereignty, especially in a country which has 
solemnly declared, in its Declaration of Independence, the inalienable 
right of all men to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”150 
During the Civil War, many Republicans adopted radical abolitionist 
principles concerning the federal government’s obligation to eradicate 
slavery.  The Thirteenth Amendment’s grant of power to Congress over 
matters resembling incidents of servitude signaled a break from 
moderate antislavery leanings.151  Moderates wanted states to gradually 
and separately end slavery.  But, for a brief time at the end of the Civil 
War, a radical form of abolitionism held the reins of Congress.152 
President Abraham Lincoln abandoned gradualism by 1863 and 
eventually supported immediate abolition through the Thirteenth 
Amendment.153  He had embraced natural rights philosophy years before 
he sat in the Oval Office.154  Lincoln believed that the Declaration’s 
guarantees applied equally to whites and blacks.155  He asserted that 
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blacks were never meant to be excluded from the human rights 
guarantees of the Declaration.156 
The Declaration’s recognition that “all men are created equal” 
influenced a generation of Republicans, who, like Lincoln, played vital 
roles in passing the proposed Thirteenth Amendment through Congress.  
They intended the Amendment to protect the self-evident natural rights 
to which the Declaration had committed the national government.  This 
perspective appears repeatedly in the Congressional debates on the 
proposed amendment. 
A U.S. Representative, who advocated passage of the Amendment, 
regarded it as the legal means for ending a variety of injustices connected 
to slavery: 
What vested rights so high or so sacred as a man’s right to himself, 
to his wife and children, to his liberty, and to the fruits of his own 
industry?  Did not our fathers declare that those rights were 
inalienable?  And if a man cannot himself alienate those rights, how 
I can another man alienate them without being himself a robber of 
the vested rights of his brother-man?157 
Slavery violated principles of the American Revolution that sparked 
opposition to British infringement on American liberties.  Within this 
national history, the Thirteenth Amendment brought the Constitution, 
which originally protected the institution of slavery, into harmony with 
the Declaration of Independence.158  As Charles Black pointed out:  “The 
thirteenth amendment had lain latent in the Declaration of 
Independence. . . .  The generation that abolished slavery made such a 
choice, as to the matter wherein the hypocrisy of the Declaration had 
seemed most startling.  But the Declaration of Independence is still 
here.”159  By passing the Thirteenth Amendment, Radical Republicans, 
pursuant to their abolitionist roots, altered the Constitution to reflect the 
practical implications of Revolutionary ideology. 
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The Thirteenth Amendment provides a method of enforcement for the 
protection of those civil liberties that, until the Amendment’s ratification, 
had been valued but not implemented.  The Amendment allows 
Congress to secure life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness through 
positive laws.160  The Declaration could only provide an inspirational 
token for abolitionists and Reconstructionists since it did not end slavery 
and the Constitution lacked any clear recognition of its principles.161  The 
Thirteenth Amendment’s Enforcement Clause became the constitutional 
vehicle for ending any vestiges of slavery and involuntary servitude.  
More importantly, from a contemporary perspective, the Amendment 
established a constitutional guarantee of freedom.  Without the power 
granted under the Thirteenth Amendment, Stevens pointed out, the 
Constitution protected slavery and the federal government lacked any 
power to regulate it.162 
Behind the Thirteenth Amendment’s enforcement provision lies a 
national commitment to secure personal autonomy as the best path to 
civil welfare.  Progressive advocates of the first reconstruction 
amendment made an earnest effort to remove impediments to civil 
rights.  They regarded the Thirteenth Amendment as a means of 
restoring the natural rights long denied to blacks, in particular, and wage 
earners, in general.  According to Radical Republicans, former slaves not 
only were freed from bondage, but also gained the right to make 
fundamental choices regarding matters affecting their jobs and families.  
Congressman M. Russell Thayer of Pennsylvania expressed the meaning 
of liberty for these former slaves in general, rhetorical terms: 
What kind of freedom is that which is given by the amendment of 
the Constitution, and if it is confined simply to the exemption of the 
freedom from sale and barter?  Do you give freedom to a man when  
 
 160 See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d. Sess. 142 (1865) (Ind. Rep. Godlove S. Orth). 
 161 The remark of Alvan Stewart, an antislavery attorney, on the Declaration is 
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 162 See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 265 (1865). 
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you allow him to be deprived of those great natural rights to which 
every man is entitled by nature?163 
Radical Republicans relied on the Declaration of Independence to 
elucidate the proposed amendment.  Representative Godlove S. Orth 
from Indiana expected the Amendment to “be a practical application of 
that self-evident truth” of the Declaration’s decree “‘that [all men] are 
endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights; that among 
these, are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.’”164  The 
Amendment’s more progressive advocates made an “earnest and 
determined effort” to remove impediments standing in the way of 
human rights.165  Francis W. Kellogg, Representative of Michigan, traced 
the sources of the proposed amendment both to the Declaration and to 
the Constitution’s Preamble, with its requirements that government 
promote the general welfare and secure liberty.166  Illinois Representative 
Ebon C. Ingersoll, who was elected to the Thirty-Eighth Congress to fill 
the vacancy created by the death of legendary abolitionist Owen 
Lovejoy, voiced the desire to secure slaves’ “natural” and “inalienable” 
rights because blacks have the right to “live in a state of freedom.”167  He 
asserted that they have a right to profit from their labors and to enjoy 
conjugal happiness without fear of forced separations at the behest of 
uncompassionate masters.168 
Representative Thomas T. Davis believed that the framers had 
anticipated that slavery would eventually end since they secured civil 
and religious liberty through the Declaration of Independence.169  
Representative John F. Farnsworth of Illinois thought the “old fathers 
who made the Constitution . . . believed that slavery was at war with the 
rights of human nature.”170  On the other hand, Representative William 
D. Kelley of Pennsylvania thought the “errors” of the founding fathers  
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for compromising with wrongs were being expiated by “blood and 
agony and death.”171 
Congressional debates on the proposed Thirteenth Amendment 
sometimes explained the specific freedoms it meant to guarantee.  Those 
debates indicated that the Enforcement Clause grants Congress a broad-
ranging power to construe and protect civil rights in accordance with 
American commitments to fundamental liberties. 
B. Insight from Debates on the Thirteenth Amendment 
Debates on the Thirteenth Amendment provide insight into the extent 
of Congress’s reach under its Section 2 enforcement power.  Both the 
Senate and the House determined to expand federal constitutional 
authority enough to make the national government responsible for 
ending infringements on fundamental rights.  Congressional debates 
shed light on how the Thirteenth Amendment changed the dynamic 
between the federal and state governments in the area of civil rights. 
Soon after Ohio Representative James M. Ashley introduced the 
proposed Thirteenth Amendment in Congress,172  President Lincoln gave 
a speech in Baltimore on the uncertain nature of freedom.  On April 18, 
1864, the President observed: 
The world has never had a good definition of liberty, and the 
American people, just now, are much in need of one.  We all declare 
for liberty; but in using the same word we do not all mean the same 
thing.  With some the word liberty may mean for each man to do as 
he pleases with himself, and the product of his labor; while with 
others the same word may mean for some men to do as they please 
with other men, and the product of other men’s labor.  Here are two, 
not only different, but incompatible things, called by the same 
name, liberty.173 
Members of the Thirty-Eighth Congress who debated on passing the 
proposed Thirteenth Amendment did much to dispel this paradoxical 
vagueness. 
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Supporters of the Thirteenth Amendment had a principled aim of 
securing liberty, even though their arguments were sometimes tempered 
by political considerations.174  Their speeches were often filled with a 
penetrating understanding of human rights that seemingly eluded the 
founding generation with its concessions to slavery.175  In retrospect, 
Isaac N. Arnold, who had served in Congress during the Civil War, 
considered the debates on the Thirteenth Amendment to have been “the 
most important in American history.  Indeed it would be difficult to find 
any others so important in the history of the world.”176  The 
revolutionary constitutional changes that the Thirteenth Amendment 
heralded brought into sharp relief the original Constitution’s protections 
of slavery.  Even the Bill of Rights had failed to end that institution.177  To 
others, ending slavery through a constitutional amendment was a logical 
extension of the work of the “old fathers who made the Constitution” 
because the framers “fought for the rights of human nature, and they 
believed that slavery was at war with the rights of human nature.”178 
Debates on an abolition amendment arose at a time when the South’s 
secession had left Congress under the leadership of members who 
wished to eradicate institutionalized slavery, which they understood to 
be the origin of the Civil War.179  The Emancipation Proclamation did not 
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adequately deal with the problem.  Indeed, congressmen and President 
Lincoln recognized that the Proclamation was inadequate to eradicate 
slavery since its legal justification rested on the President’s wartime 
powers and would be ineffectual following the end of conflict.180  The 
constitutional uncertainties surrounding the Emancipation Proclamation 
gave rise to the political resolve to pass a constitutional amendment 
abolishing slavery.181 
Sustained debate on the proposed Thirteenth Amendment did not 
begin until mid March of 1864 and concluded with its passage on 
January 31, 1865.182  During that period, several congressmen proposed 
resolutions.183  The most ambitious of these was Charles Sumner’s 
proposal proving that, “[e]verywhere within the limits of the United 
States, and of each State or Territory thereof, all persons are equal before 
the law, so that no person can hold another as a slave.”184  When the 
Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Lyman Trumbull, reported 
the language of the House and Senate’s joint resolution, it lacked 
Sumner’s proposed wording on equality.185  This was a missed 
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opportunity that required the passage of another amendment, the 
Fourteenth, which did include an equal protection clause.186 
Despite their inability to foresee how difficult it would be to secure 
equality for blacks,187 the Thirty-Eighth Congress adopted two powerful, 
though pithy, sections.  The Thirteenth Amendment’s supporters 
expected Section 2 to enable Congress to secure the benefits of national 
citizenship, including the freedom to travel, labor, and alienate 
property.188  In retrospect, Representative Thayer said that the 
Amendment was meant to benefit freemen with the “great charter of 
liberty.”189  Massachusetts Senator Henry Wilson’s perspective that the 
proposed amendment would guard the “sacred rights” of whites and 
blacks was typical among the Amendment’s supporters.190  Philadelphia 
Representative Kelley sought to establish universal liberty that would 
allow everyone to enjoy the “beneficent republican institutions.”191  
Blacks were the main victims of slavery, but many Republicans also 
blamed the institution for degrading all labor, including white labor.192 
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Representative Arnold believed that liberty and equality for all 
citizens would be the Amendment’s “great cornerstone.”193  The 
Amendment was meant to transform American society by guaranteeing 
civil liberty to all racial and economic strata of the population.  Everyone, 
regardless of race, occupation, or resources, was to be an equal before the 
law.194  Radical Republican Ingersoll proclaimed that the Thirteenth 
Amendment would secure natural and God-given rights.195  Although 
Ingersoll’s statement was vague, as were those of many participants in 
the debates, it expressed an expectation that future congressional policies 
on behalf of the general welfare would be predicated on the country’s 
foundational principles.  Forced servitude itself was a violation of 
freedom to “enjoy God’s free sunshine” and the right to reap the benefits 
of labor.196  Poor white laborers, much like their black bretheren, Ingersoll 
believed, would benefit from emancipation since slavery kept them in 
ignorance, poverty, and degradation.  He and other Congressmen thus 
conceived of slavery in broad terms, much as Revolutionaries had.  The 
Thirteenth Amendment was to end the individual- and state-sponsored 
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despotism abolitionists had analogized to the oppressiveness the 
country’s framers fought against. 197 
A civil transformation should have occurred at the time of the 
Revolution, but the pragmatics of nation-making had crippled reform.  
The failure of conviction had allowed local biases to trump individual 
rights.  Only the national government could achieve the broad-ranging 
reform. The Thirty-Eighth Congress determined to supersede sectional 
sensitivities with a legislative power over racialist and classist behavior.  
To only free slaves by amendment and leave them at the mercy of state 
prejudices was likely to create an underclass.  Federal power would need 
to extend beyond abolition, to matters affecting the daily lives of 
individuals.  If “freedom” was to mean nothing more than liberation 
from shackles, Representative and future president James A. Garfield 
pointed out in 1865, then it would be “a bitter mockery” and “a cruel 
delusion.”198  For freedom to be a triumphant end of slavery, the 
Thirteenth Amendment needed to provide government with the power 
to end all the concomitant detriments associated with the institution.  
Debates on the Amendment indicate that Congress believed that 
abolition would guarantee newly freed blacks and all American citizens 
a variety of rights.  Freedom would make blacks active participants in a 
political system that whites had dominated since the country’s 
founding.199 
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Freedom also had political implications since Revolutionaries had 
denounced British despotism for excluding them from political 
participation.  Prohibiting blacks and other disenfranchised groups from 
holding political office violated the principles of the Declaration of 
Independence, Representative Stevens asserted, because the government 
of the United States was never meant to be under the sovereignty of 
races, dynasties, and families.200  The equal right to govern was innate to 
everyone “no matter what [their] shape or color.”201 
The Declaration recognized the inalienable nature of civil and religious 
liberty and their centrality in founding a new country. 202  The Thirteenth 
Amendment was to grant the missing federal enforcement power to 
guarantee that birthright.203  Proponents assumed that slavery violated 
the fundamental principles of the social contract, which they regarded as 
binding in spite of the constitutional protections of slavery.  For them, 
the Preamble superseded the legal sanctions of slavery. 
Radicals incorporated the natural truths of the Declaration and the 
Preamble into the Amendment.204  Many in the Thirty-Eighth Congress 
recognized that laws that barred blacks from engaging in ordinary 
business, entering into contracts, and acquiring an education 
compromised the country’s founding principles.205  The Thirteenth 
Amendment, therefore, did much more than simply sever the de facto 
and de jure connections that bound slaves to their masters.206  As 
Representative Frederick E. Woodbridge of Vermont put it, passing the  
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Amendment assured that at the end of the War, “the goddess of Liberty. 
. . . may look north and south, east and west, upon a free nation 
untarnished by aught inconsistent with freedom.”207 
Some of the ideals expressed during the congressional debates were 
visionary and not realized even after the Thirteenth Amendment’s 
ratification.  Senator James Harlan of Iowa, during the Senate debate of 
1864, exposed the suppression arising from the South’s peculiar 
institution of slavery.  He was the first to coin the term “incidents of 
servitude,” which the Court has since adopted for identifying the range 
of oppressions the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits.208  Harlan listed 
interference with parental and marital relationships, the prohibition 
against participation on juries, restrictions against black property 
ownership, interference with the right to testify in court, and the 
suppression of free speech as examples of the incidents of servitude.209  
Senator Henry Wilson, who had opposed slavery from his youth, 210 
believed that the abolition of those incidents would renew the United 
States’s commitment to its creed of liberty: 
If this amendment shall be incorporated by the will of the nation 
into the Constitution of the United States, it will obliterate the last 
lingering vestiges of the slave system; its chattelizing, degrading, 
and bloody codes; its dark, malignant, barbarizing spirit; all it was 
and is, everything connected with it or pertaining to it, from the face of 
the nation it was scarred with moral desolation, from the bosom of 
the country it has reddened with the blood and strewn with the 
graves of patriotism.  The incorporation of this amendment into the 
organic law of the nation will make impossible forevermore the 
reappearing of the discarded slave system, and the returning of the 
despotism of the slavemasters’ domination.211 
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In place of slavery’s chains, federal law would respect natural rights by 
protecting family interests.212  Enforced ignorance, too, was a hallmark of 
involuntary servitude, and education was essential to dispelling it.213 
A consensus grew during the congressional debates that the 
Thirteenth Amendment would empower Congress to pass legislation 
directed at any arbitrary practice associated with involuntary servitude 
and slavery.214  The rupture between the Confederacy and the Union 
empowered a federalist-minded group of legislators to make America’s 
founding assertions enforceable.215  During the Civil War, many 
Republicans adopted radical abolitionist principles about the federal 
government’s obligation to eradicate slavery, and many of the opponents 
of the Thirteenth Amendment decried this republican brand of 
federalism.216  Even President Lincoln, who believed slavery was “a total 
violation” of the Declaration of Independence, initially held to a 
gradualist, state-by-state approach.217  His views changed only during 
the Civil War when he realized that southern states would not abandon 
their expansionist ambitions.218 
Reconstruction, which began to take shape after Lincoln’s death, 
provided an opportunity to address human rights violations through 
federal legislation.  During that period, Congress passed three 
amendments, beginning with the Thirteenth, which granted the national 
government a degree of power to protect civil rights that it had never 
possessed before.219  During the Reconstruction Congress’s brief hold on 
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power, it passed legislation guaranteeing equal access to the courts, the 
right to purchase and convey real and personal property, and the power 
to enter and enforce contracts.220 
A national commitment to individual liberties and civil welfare is the 
basis of Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment Enforcement Clause 
authority.  Radical advocates of the first Reconstruction Amendment 
granted federal legislators the power to decide what liberties are 
essential to a fulfilling life, debated the means of securing those 
fundamental interests, and then passed laws punishing their 
abridgement.  Freedom without the “great natural rights,” as 
Congressman Thayer called them, would be chimerical.221  Radicals 
overlooked the stalemates that could result from diverging views on 
natural rights and only came to understand the need for additional 
constitutional guarantees after repeated civil rights clashes with 
President Andrew Johnson.  The Fourteenth Amendment was meant to 
fill the missing specificity.  Despite the Thirteenth Amendment’s broad 
language, contemporaries understood that it dramatically shifted power 
away from the states to the federal government.222 
Congressmen who worked against the proposed Thirteenth 
Amendment realized that Republicans aimed to do more than simply 
end forced labor.  The proposal’s opponents feared that abolishing 
slavery would be tantamount to granting blacks political and civic rights, 
like the right to vote and to be part of a jury.223  A memorable exchange 
between Representatives William D. Kelley and John D. Stiles, both from 
Pennsylvania, indicates that the advocates on both sides of the argument 
realized the Thirteenth Amendment could be used to obtain equal 
citizenship rights for blacks, even though the Amendment never 
explicitly mentioned them.  Stiles inquired whether the Amendment 
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would favor racial equality between the races.224  Kelley responded that 
blacks should not be excluded from political power because of arbitrary, 
racialist views.225  The concern of losing white control over the 
government was also on Representative Chilton A. White’s mind: 
Do you propose to enfranchise them, and make them “before the 
law,” . . . the equals of the white man; give them the right to 
suffrage; the right to hold office; the right to sit on juries?  Do you 
intend . . . to make this a mongrel Government, instead of a white 
man’s Government?226 
Section 2 of the proposed amendment, containing the Enforcement 
Clause, gave the greatest pause to Congressmen who opposed passing it 
onto the states for ratification.227  The section, as its drafters understood it 
and as the Supreme Court later interpreted it,228 went far beyond merely 
granting Congress the power to enact legislation against the exploitation 
of slaves.  It went to the core purposes of government and used the 
broad language of liberty that the country’s founding generation had 
also adopted.  Ohio Senator John Sherman, who went on to be Secretary 
of the Treasury under Rutherford B. Hayes and, later, Secretary of State 
under President William McKinley, considered the Thirteenth 
Amendment to be a “guarantee of liberty” and its second section “an 
express grant of power to Congress to secure this liberty by appropriate 
legislation.”229  Unless the rights of citizens everywhere were the same, 
“freedom” was meaningless.230 
Schuyler Colfax, the incoming Speaker of the House for the Thirty-
Ninth Congress, opened the session in 1865 with a statement on 
Congress’s power under the Thirteenth Amendment.  “[I]t is yours,” 
Colfax told the House, 
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to mature and enact legislation which . . . shall establish [state 
governments] anew on such a basis of enduring justice as will 
guarantee all necessary safeguards to the people, and afford what 
our Magna Carta, the Declaration of Independence, proclaims is the 
chief object of government-protection of all men in their inalienable 
rights.231 
His ideas reflected the dominant congressional view on the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s scope prior to the beginning of debates on the proposed 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Senator Trumbull, in 1866, about a year after 
the states ratified the Amendment, reiterated that Section 2 gives 
Congress the power to adopt any legislation necessary for achieving 
liberty.232  He regarded the ambit of congressional power to extend to 
ending interference with commercial transactions, ownership rights, and 
educational enrollment.233 
Both the adversaries and supporters of abolition relied on the 
founding fathers to bolster their respective arguments.  Opponents of the 
proposed amendment charged that its adoption was an impermissible 
assertion of power since the amendment would materially alter 
government as the founders had envisioned it.234  The founders, Senator 
Willard Saulsbury of Delaware insisted, wanted to preserve the right to 
slave property, not to give the Union “control over the domestic relations 
existing in the States, [and] not to regulate the right and title to property 
in the States.”235 
Representative Kellogg asserted, to the contrary, that the Thirteenth 
Amendment was meant to promote the general welfare — the primary 
object of the Constitution.236  Congressman Morris of New York held the 
contractarian perspective that the Constitution could be amended to 
prohibit slavery since “each member upon entering society covenants to 
yield his particular to the general good, and to so comport as to infract 
none of the rights of others, and also not to incapacitate himself for the 
discharge of the duties growing out of the social relations.”237  Another 
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Republican believed slavery was an evil the founders accepted but 
“regarded as temporary in its character and as tolerable only by reason 
of the exigencies of the hour.”238 
C. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 
Soon after ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, cases 
interpreting the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which Congress passed 
pursuant to its enforcement authority, began to proceed through the 
courts.239  Surveying the legislative history of this statute is critical for 
evaluating the Supreme Court cases that interpreted it.  During debates 
preceding the Act’s passage, congressmen continued to rely on the same 
radical abolitionist conception of fundamental rights that they had relied 
on during the years prior to the ratification of the Thirteenth 
Amendment.240  They regarded the protection of civil rights to be a 
primary purpose of government.  The Act reflected Congress’s 
commitment to enacting legal protections for blacks that would do more 
than merely unshackle them from their masters’ control.  It explicitly 
prohibited violations against civil rights, such as the right to contract.241 
Furthermore, Congress meant to make freedom universal.  The Act was 
primarily intended to end injustices against blacks, but it likewise 
protected the rights of all citizens, regardless of their race.242  Senator 
Sherman argued that real liberty was more than mere emancipation; 
therefore, a law passed pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment would 
have to secure citizens’ rights to testify at trial, to own property, to profit 
from their labor, to raise a family, to acquire an education, and to 
travel.243 
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The Enforcement Clause of the Thirteenth Amendment changed the 
federalist dynamic between states and the federal government, making 
Congress, rather than state legislatures, the supreme protector of civil 
liberties.  Senator Wilson regarded civil rights to be “the true office of 
Government to protect” and believed that their possession “by the 
citizen raises by necessary implication the power in Congress to protect 
them.”244  Senator Sherman argued that the power to enact civil rights 
legislation was even more explicitly found in the second section of the 
Thirteenth Amendment:  “[It] is not only a guarantee of liberty to every 
inhabitant of the United States, but an express grant of power to 
Congress to secure this liberty by appropriate legislation.”245  The 
Thirteenth Amendment granted Congress the enforcement authority it 
needed to authorize enactments on behalf of the nation’s citizenry.246 
The congressional debates on the Thirteenth Amendment and Civil 
Rights Act of 1866, along with the handful of Supreme Court opinions on 
Reconstruction era statutes, provide the best sources for expanding on 
the Amendment’s grant of enforcement authority.  These sources 
indicate that the Amendment grants Congress the power to put into 
effect the principles of the Declaration of Independence and the 
Preamble to the Constitution.  What is needed to achieve progress in civil 
rights is a clarification of the Thirteenth Amendment’s notion of 
nationally guaranteed liberal equality. 
IV. THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 
The new standards that the Supreme Court has placed on the 
Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment make it more 
difficult for Congress to rely on them for the passage of civil rights 
legislation.  The Thirteenth Amendment is an alternative constitutional 
grant of authority for regulating discrimination against identifiable 
groups.  The Thirteenth Amendment, as Part V will point out, can 
sometimes better protect against unequal treatment because, unlike the 
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Fourteenth Amendment, it has no state action requirement making 
private discrimination actionable.  Further, unlike the Commerce Clause, 
it is not an economic constitutional provision, but one established on 
revolutionary and abolitionist notions of liberty and equality. 
The Court’s earliest interpretations of the Thirteenth Amendment 
prevented the full implementation of abolitionist ideals, and only the 
Civil Rights movement of the 1960s led to an understanding of liberty 
approaching that of the Radical Republicans.  Finally, the Warren and 
Burger Courts’ Thirteenth Amendment holdings, which the Rehnquist 
Court did not truncate, embraced a broad understanding of Congress’s 
enforcement power. 
A. Early Judicial Interpretation 
The earliest interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 boded well 
for ending practices associated with slavery and involuntary servitude.  
United States v. Rhodes247 was the first federal decision on the 
constitutionality of the Act.  It asserted that the abolition amendment 
“consecrates the entire territory of the republic to freedom, as well as to 
free institutions.”248  Supreme Court Justice Noah Swayne,249 presiding 
over the case as a designated circuit court justice, held that the Thirteenth 
Amendment empowered Congress to pass the Act and federal courts to 
adjudicate cases arising out of it.  The white defendant was charged with 
committing burglary against Nancy Talbot, “a citizen of the United 
States of, the African race.”250  The case was litigated in a federal district 
court because Kentucky law forbade blacks from testifying against 
whites in state courts.251  In dictum, Justice Swayne posited that without 
congressional power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment, “simple 
abolition . . . would have been a phantom of delusion.”252  The 
Amendment reversed the policy of the original Constitution and gave 
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Congress authority to prohibit discrimination.253 
The Supreme Court ruled very differently in Blyew v. United States, 
which commenced a judicial trend that downplayed the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s pertinence to Revolutionary and abolitionist notions of 
freedom.254  It was the first blow to the use of the Thirteenth Amendment 
for ending centuries of racial intolerance.  The two defendants were 
indicted in 1868, when Kentucky still forbade black witnesses from 
testifying against whites.255 
Both the oral and physical evidence at trial showed that in one night 
John Blyew and George Kennard, two white men, murdered three 
generations of a black family.256  The case had been removed to district 
court pursuant to section 3 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.257  That section 
permitted removal “of all causes, civil and criminal, affecting persons 
who are denied, or cannot enforce in the courts or judicial tribunals of 
the State, or locality where they may be.”258  The U.S. Solicitor General 
argued that the right to testify protected persons and property and was a 
freedom the Thirteenth Amendment authorized Congress to secure for 
all citizens regardless of their race.259 
The Supreme Court declined to rule on the defendant’s assertion that 
the 1866 Civil Rights Act’s removal provision was unconstitutional, 
instead deciding Blyew on a technical, statutory ground.  The Court held 
that the district court had no jurisdiction to hear the case because the 
murder had not directly affected the two surviving witnesses to the 
crime who were both black.260  All those who had been affected by the 
crime, according to the Court’s interpretation of section 3 of the Act, had 
been murdered.  The Court considered it irrelevant that even if the black 
victims had survived the assault, they could not have testified in a 
Kentucky court against the white defendants.261  Litigation could not 
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affect the murder victims and, therefore, the Court reversed the 
defendants’ federal convictions without even remanding the case. 
Justice Joseph Bradley, dissenting with Justice Swayne, criticizedboth 
the majority’s “narrow” reading of the Civil Rights Act and its disregard 
for the liberal ideals surrounding the statute’s passage.262  Justice Bradley 
argued that Congress broadly intended to prevent wanton, racist 
conduct from being committed against the black community.263  The 
Thirteenth Amendment attempted to “do away with the incidents and 
consequences of slavery” and to replace them with “civil liberty and 
equality.”264  His dissent further concluded that the Amendment’s 
primary aim was to instate blacks to the “full enjoyment” of civil 
rights.265  He also recognized that the majority opinion legitimized 
Kentucky’s practice of prohibiting blacks from testifying against whites; 
thereby, the state branded all blacks “with a badge of slavery.”266 
B. Segregationist Decisions 
While Blyew turned on a procedural matter, the Civil Rights Cases 
initiated a substantive period of decline.267  It drew the country back to 
countenancing intolerance for the sake of national tranquility, much like 
the founding generation had decided to countenance slavery despite its 
eloquent denounciation of despotism.  The abolitionist forces in 
Congress had succeeded in making remarkable change to the 
Constitution, but the Supreme Court found a way of interpreting the 
instrument according to the views of its opponents in the Thirty-Eighth 
Congress.268  Justice Bradley, who wrote for the majority, qualified his 
earlier dissent in Blyew, essentially abandoning the Radical 
Reconstructionist project to animate the Declaration of Independence’s 
statement of equal freedom.269 
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The Civil Rights Cases evaluated the constitutionality of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1875,270 the Reconstruction Congress’s last major piece of civil 
rights legislation.271  By the time the case came before the Supreme Court 
in 1883, Reconstruction had ground to a halt despite the many remaining 
institutions and practices that resembled involuntary servitude.  The 
country had failed to provide the protections of fundamental rights that 
abolitionists had advocated.  Among the most racialist institutions 
designed to retain the burdens of slavery were segregation, peonage, the 
use of adhesion contracts for sharecropping, and the convict lease 
system.272 
The Civil Rights Cases concerned five joint cases from various parts of 
the country.273  The first four were reviews of criminal prosecutions.274  
Two of the defendants had been charged with denying blacks access to 
an inn or hotel, a third with prohibiting a black individual access to the 
dress circle of a theater in San Francisco, and another with refusing 
access to a New York opera house.275  The fifth case was a civil case from 
Tennessee about a railroad company whose conductor denied a black 
woman access to “ride in the ladies’ car.”276  Attorneys for four of the five 
defendants did not even bother coming to argue the cases before the 
Court.277  The Court nevertheless handed their clients a favorable ruling 
rooted in the emerging national consensus against civil rights reform.278  
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The decision had far-ranging implications on congressional Thirteenth 
and Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers.  The effects have been 
so long lasting that two recent Supreme Court opinions relied on the 
Civil Rights Cases’ holding to diminish congressional civil rights 
powers.279 
In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court held that Congress had overstepped 
its Fourteenth Amendment power when it prohibited private place of 
accommodation discrimination.280  The Court, therefore, found the first 
two sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 to be unconstitutional.  In the 
unreconstructed South, the idea that states would regulate private 
discrimination was farfetched.  Justice Bradley made an artificial 
dichotomy, although one that was common in post-Reconstruction 
United States, between civil rights and social rights.281  It was this same 
dichotomy that Senator Sumner, who was the Act’s main supporter, had 
said was raised at every stage of civil rights reform.282  It went hand in 
hand, he said, with the “vain” argument that “there is no denial of Equal 
Rights when this separation is enforced.”283  Justice Bradley was unable 
to see through the artificiality of rejecting integration as a form of social 
equality.  In the Civil Rights Cases, he held that the Fourteenth 
Amendment covered economic rights such as making contracts and 
leasing land, but not social rights, which pertained to using public 
accommodations.284  Thus, as Angela P. Harris pointed out:  “The Court 
had curtailed the power to protect American citizens against racial 
domination in the name of federalism.”285 
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admission to inns, public conveyances, and places of amusement.  It supersedes and 
displaces state legislation on the same subject, or only allows it permissive force.”). 
 281 Id. at 22. 
 282 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 382-83 (1872). 
 283 Id. 
 284 James W. Fox, Jr., Re-Readings & Misreadings:  Slaughter-House, Privileges or 
Immunities, & Section Five Enforcement Powers, 91 KY. L.J. 67, 160-61 (2003) (explaining 
distinction made during mid-nineteenth century between social, civil, and political rights). 
 285 Angela P. Harris, Equality Trouble:  Sameness & Difference in Twentieth-Century Race 
Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1923, 1961 (2000). 
  
2006] A Civil Rights Approach 1825 
The only member of the Court who disagreed with the majority was 
Justice John Marshall Harlan.286  His view of congressional enforcement 
power was analogous to Radical Republican principles of 
Reconstruction.  His robust understanding of liberty was compatible 
with abolitionist efforts to integrate the country.  The fifth section of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Harlan wrote in dissent, enabled 
Congress to enact any “appropriate legislation” to prohibit states, 
individuals, and corporations from discriminating on account of race.287  
Justice Harlan determined that neither states nor licensed businesses 
could arbitrarily curtail inalienable rights intrinsic to national 
citizenship.  In his mind, citizens could not be deprived of “rights 
inhering in a state of freedom” for which all generations, from the 
country’s founding, had struggled.288 
The plaintiffs also brought the Civil Rights Cases pursuant to the 
Thirteenth Amendment.  The Supreme Court’s holding was the first 
substantive interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment’s guarantee of 
liberty.  The Court recognized that the Amendment went farther than 
simply releasing slaves from their masters’ control.289  In fact, Justice 
Bradley reiterated his conviction that the Thirteenth Amendment 
granted Congress the power to pass “all necessary and proper laws for 
the obliteration and prevention of slavery, with all its badges and 
incidents.”290  Justice Bradley even conceded that the Thirteenth 
Amendment prohibited state and private violations.291  However, he 
rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that public accommodation discrimination 
was a vestige of servitude.292 
As in the Fourteenth Amendment part of its opinion, the Court again 
differentiated between social rights and the “fundamental rights which 
appertain to the essence of citizenship.”293  The ruling thereby limited 
 
 286 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 27. 
 287 Id. at 32. 
 288 According to Justice Harlan, the majority’s opinion so “construed” the “state of 
freedom . . . belonging to American citizenship” as to “defeat the ends the people desired to 
accomplish, which they attempted to accomplish, and which they supposed they had 
accomplished by changes in their fundamental law.”  Id. at 33 (Harlan, J. dissenting). 
 289 See id. at 20 (majority opinion). 
 290 Id. at 20-21. 
 291 See id. at 20. 
 292 Id. at 25. 
 293 Id. at 22.  Justice Bradley went on to say that the Thirteenth Amendment “simply 
abolished slavery” while the Fourteenth Amendment “prohibited the states from abridging 
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”  Id. at 23.  His conclusions 
deviate from his dissent to Blyew v. United States, in which he recognized Congress’s power 
to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1866.  Provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 indicate that 
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congressional Thirteenth Amendment power to the protection of civil 
rights.  Federal legislation could only end practices directly related to 
institutional slavery, including impediments to black court testimony 
and property ownership.294  Based on this line of reasoning, the Court 
held that Congress had overreached its Thirteenth Amendment 
authority when it passed the Civil Rights Act of 1875 to prohibit social 
discrimination.295 
Justice Bradley’s minimization of the extent to which a public carrier 
can infringe on civil liberties through exclusionary social practices left 
virtually no recourse against segregation.  Social discrimination limited 
the plaintiffs’ ability to travel comfortably, enjoy an opera, reserve a 
room at an inn, or watch a play.  Such bigotry degraded victims and 
marked them with a badge of inferiority.  Social exclusion deprived 
blacks of the ability to exercise preferences, while perpetuating a white 
supremacism intrinsically linked to slavery.  Their lot remained even 
worse than that of the Revolutionaries who had analogized British 
despotism to enslavement.  Fifty years after William Lloyd Garrison had 
published the Liberator, which enervated the abolitionist movement,296 
the country remained unwilling to recognize black’s claims to freedom.  
The Court’s holding in the Civil Rights Cases showed a callousness 
toward the private and public impediments that prevented blacks, even 
after the end of slavery, from enjoying the freedom of citizenship.  Justice 
Bradley’s dismissive opinion furthered the social tensions that the 
Radical Republicans expected Congress would end through the 
Enforcement Clause of the Thirteenth Amendment.  Homegrown militias 
and private business owners who refused to provide blacks with goods 
and services were now protected by state indifference or outright 
 
congressmen regarded the Thirteenth Amendment as a conduit of equal rights legislation.  
See George A. Schell, Note, Open Housing:  Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. & Title VIII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1968, 18 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 556 (1969) (discussing courts’ differentiation 
between social and civil rights). 
 294 See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 22. 
 295 Justice Bradley put this point in the form of a reductio ad absurdum: 
It would be running the slavery argument into the ground to make it apply to 
every act of discrimination which a person may see fit to make as to the guests he 
will entertain, or as to the people he will take into his coach or cab or car, or 
admit to his concert or theater, or deal with in other matters of intercourse or 
business. 
Id. at 24-25. 
 296 HENRY MAYER, ALL ON FIRE:  WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON & THE ABOLITION OF 
SLAVERY (1998). 
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support for their practices.297 
In dissent, Justice Harlan understood the Court to be countenancing 
state-sponsored abridgements of freedom.298  The majority’s opinion, he 
argued, was “narrow and artificial” and inimical to the “substance and 
spirit” of the Thirteenth Amendment.299  Justice Harlan understood that 
since the myth of black inferiority was integral to maintaining slavery, 
the Thirteenth Amendment’s guarantee of freedom required the federal 
government to pass laws punishing the abridgment of freedom, 
especially when that abridgment was based on racism.300  This principle, 
for Justice Harlan, carried a practical implication: 
Congress, therefore, under its express power to enforce that 
amendment, by appropriate legislation, may enact laws to protect 
that people against the deprivation, on account of their race, of any 
civil rights enjoyed by other freemen in the same state; and such 
legislation may be of a direct and primary character, operating upon 
states, their officers and agents, and also upon, at least, such 
individuals and corporations as exercise public functions and wield 
power and authority under the state.301 
While Justice Harlan saw no need to dispute Justice Bradley’s assertion 
that Congress lacked authority over social rights, he considered the use 
of public accommodations to be intrinsic to civil life and, therefore, 
 
 297 See id. at 25.  Justice Bradley explicitly argued that equal access to public amenities is 
unconnected to the enjoyment of fundamental rights: 
There were thousands of free colored people in this country before the abolition 
of slavery, enjoying all the essential rights of life, liberty, and property the same 
as white citizens; yet no one, at that time, thought that it was any invasion of 
their personal status as freemen because they were not admitted to all the 
privileges enjoyed by white citizens, or because they were subjected to 
discriminations in the enjoyment of accommodations in inns, public 
conveyances, and places of amusement. 
Id. 
 298 See id. at 53-54 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 299 Id. at 26. 
 300 See id. at 36. 
I do hold that since slavery, as the court has repeatedly declared, was the moving 
or principal cause of the adoption of that amendment, and since that institution 
rested wholly upon the inferiority, as a race, of those held in bondage, their 
freedom necessarily involved immunity from, and protection against, all 
discrimination against them, because of their race, in respect of such civil rights 
as belong to freemen of other races. 
Id. 
 301 Id. 
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amenable to regulation.302 
After the Civil Rights Cases, the Thirteenth Amendment fell into virtual 
disuse.  Indeed, the Court continued to chip away at the sparse 
legislation Congress managed to pass prior to the collapse of 
Reconstruction.  Following the Civil Rights Cases, the Court maintained 
the distinction between social and civil rights in Plessy v. Ferguson.303  
This step revealed a judicial aversion to abolitionist notions of freedom 
and equality.304  In finding that separate public accommodations did not 
violate the Thirteenth Amendment, the Court quoted the Civil Rights 
Cases for the proposition that the end of slavery did not require anyone 
to deal socially with other races in “matters of intercourse or business.”305  
Taking a literalist approach to slavery, Plessy attacked the assumption 
that enforced separation of the two races stamped African Americans 
with a badge of inferiority.306  Justice Henry Brown’s narrow construction 
of “slavery” was far removed from the broad Revolutionary notions of 
freedom, regarding the term as strictly a matter of forced labor.307  He 
ignored the American Revolutionary tradition, which abolitionists and 
Radical Republicans had adopted, that understood real freedom to mean 
far more than simply being able to choose an employer.  It implicated a 
right to participate in the life of the community, especially in political 
matters, which segregation made virtually inaccessible to blacks. 
As he did in the Civil Rights Cases, Justice Harlan wrote the dissent to 
Plessy.  He regarded the right of persons to travel by rail, unimpeded by 
racial limitations, to be inherent in the concept of liberty.308  His 
 
 302 See id. at 56. 
 303 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 304 See id. at 551-52. 
If the two races are to meet upon terms of social equality, it must be the result of 
natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of each other’s merits and a voluntary 
consent of individuals. . . . If the civil and political rights of both races be equal 
one cannot be inferior to the other civilly or politically.  If one race be inferior to 
the other socially, the Constitution of the United States cannot put them upon the 
same plane. 
Id. 
 305 Id. at 543 (“‘It would be running the slavery argument into the ground,’ said Mr. 
Justice Bradley, ‘to make it apply to every act of discrimination which a person may see fit 
to make as to the guests he will entertain, or as to the people he will . . . deal with in other 
matters of intercourse or business.’”  (quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 24-25)). 
 306 Id. at 551.  Only in 1954 did the Supreme Court find the “separate but equal” 
doctrine unconstitutional.  Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954) (rejecting 
language in Plessy suggesting “separate but equal is constitutional”). 
 307 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 542 (1896). 
 308 Id. at 555 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  On the importance of Justice Harlan’s dissent in 
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perspective on liberty not only was more expansive than that of the 
founders’, but it also provided an even higher degree of detail on 
national rights than the Garrisonian abolitionists had formulated.  At the 
turn of the twentieth century, Justice Harlan understood better than the 
politicians and theorists before him the extent of harm a segregated 
society would cause ostracized minorities.  Justice Harlan was prescient 
in foreseeing that the separate but equal doctrine would not be limited to 
rail travel but would harm blacks’ ability to engage in many other 
meaningful public activities.309 
C. Modern Supreme Court Decisions 
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, which the Court decided in 1968, went a long 
way toward recognizing that congressional power to prevent the 
incidents of involuntary servitude extends far beyond the prohibition of 
hereditary forced labor.310  Jones rejected the Civil Rights Cases’ parochial 
view that Congress lacks the power to prevent exclusionary, racist 
practices.  Jones found that a federal law based on the Civil Rights Act of 
1866 was “necessary and proper” for preventing private and public 
racial discrimination in real estate transactions.311  While the Jones Court 
did not directly overrule the social and civil dichotomy of the Civil Rights 
Cases and Plessy, it recognized that preventing people from living where 
they want to because of their race was an abridgement of the rights 
associated with slavery. 
The Court acknowledged Congress’s wide latitude to pass legislation 
for preventing civil rights violations:  “Surely Congress has the power 
under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to determine what are the 
badges and the incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that 
determination into effective legislation.”312  Pursuant to the Enforcement 
 
Plessy to principled legal discourse, see BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:  FOUNDATIONS 
146 (1991) and T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 
1060, 1076 (1991). 
 309 Justice Harlan understood the wide-ranging implication of the holding: 
If a state can prescribe, as a rule of civil conduct, that whites and blacks shall not 
travel as passengers in the same railroad coach, why may it not so regulate the 
use of the streets of its cities and towns as to compel white citizens to keep on 
one side of a street, and black citizens to keep on the other? 
Plessy, 163 U.S. at 557 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 310 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (upholding Congress’s power to prevent private housing 
discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1982). 
 311 Id. at 438-39. 
 312 Id. at 440. 
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Clause of the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress can prevent state and 
private encroachments on fundamental rights.  Moreover, Jones required 
courts to analyze human rights violations in a manner distinct from the 
state action analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment.313  The opinion 
shows a nascent understanding that slavery and its vestiges affected 
society as a whole, and it makes some hesitant steps toward accepting 
the abolitionist perspective of freedom.  The right to contract is treated as 
a natural right on which private parties cannot trample, but the opinion 
fails to explore the noneconomic harms associated with slavery. 
In the Supreme Court cases that followed Jones, the Court continued to 
hold that Congress can prohibit private racial discrimination pursuant to 
its Thirteenth Amendment power.  The Court further broke down racial 
barriers that had continued to inhibit freedom over a hundred years after 
the end of the Civil War.  The next landmark Thirteenth Amendment 
case, Runyon v. McCrary, reflected the Court’s willingness to extend the 
principle of liberty even beyond the Amendment’s framers’ notions. 314  
Runyon addressed the narrow issue of whether 42 U.S.C. § 1981 
prohibited private schools from refusing to enroll students based on 
their race.  The critical part of the statute provided that “all persons 
within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in 
every State . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white 
citizens.”315  Justice Potter Stewart for the majority determined that the 
school violated interested parents’ contract rights because it used racial 
criteria to deny their children enrollment.316  The Court found that even 
though parents whose children attended the school had the right not to 
associate with blacks in their private relations, their associational right 
could not legitimize school discrimination.317  The abolitionists had 
argued that slavery violated the intrinsic right to raise and educate 
children, and Runyon considered discrimination in school enrollment to 
be tied to the continued vestiges of slavery. 318 
 
 313 See infra Part V.A (distinguishing congressional Fourteenth and Thirteenth 
Amendment enforcement power). 
 314 Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976). 
 315 Id. at 160 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2004)). 
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educational services. . . . But neither school offered services on equal basis to white and 
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 317 Id. at 177-78. 
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As favorable as the Court’s holding was for the desegregation of 
schools, it could have sent an even stronger message about the nation’s 
commitment to individual liberty and the general welfare.  The Court 
should have used normative, rather than contractual, reasoning.  It 
would have done better to understand the Thirteenth Amendment as a 
prohibition against arbitrary interference with parents’ educational 
decisions rather than as a protection of only their contractual rights. 
Constitutional liberation from slavery granted Congress the power to 
protect parental autonomy, which slave codes and individual slave 
masters had decimated.319  Parents’ fundamental right to educate their 
children is more compelling than their commercial right to enter into a 
contract. 
The use of civil rights history for interpreting the Enforcement Clause 
is also helpful in understanding other associational cases.  The Court 
found a basis for congressional action in Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven 
Recreation Ass’n.320  Litigation in that case arose when a private 
swimming club refused to allow blacks to join as members or to visit as 
guests.321  Three adversely affected African Americans sought damages 
from the swimming club and asked the court to enjoin its practices.322  
They raised their claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982, both of 
which prohibit racist leasing and rental practices.323  Based on the 
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 323 The Court found no need to examine whether sections 1981 and 1982 applied to 
private discrimination, determining that it was sufficient that the “operative language” of 
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dichotomy of rights in the Civil Rights Cases, the Court might have found 
the use of the swimming pool to be a social, rather than a civil right, and 
provided the plaintiffs no relief.  The Court, instead, decided that §§ 1981 
and 1982 prohibited the club from excluding people based on race.324  
The plaintiffs entered into the real estate purchases partly based on their 
expectation of joining the recreation center.325  The swimming club 
interfered with the applicants’ right to enter into contracts by denying 
them access to a public place of accommodation.326  Just as with Runyon, 
the holding in Tillman is narrow, being grounded on contract principles 
rather than on the federal enforcement power to prevent violations of 
fundamental rights associated with the general welfare.  A more 
principled Court rationale could have articulated a notion of national 
citizenship that includes the right to freely partake of community 
amenities without the burden of racism.  Prohibiting the use of racist 
association qualifications is a legitimate aim of a post-Reconstruction 
Congress in its overall commitment to the general welfare. 
An overview of case law decided since Jones shows just how far the 
Thirteenth Amendment can reach, even when litigants rely on ancient 
civil rights statutes — in particular, sections 1981 and 1982 — that are 
modeled after the Civil Rights Act of 1866.  Certainly, discrimination in 
real estate transactions and private schools is not, in and of itself, literally 
slavery nor involuntary servitude.  Rather, the Court interpreted the 
Thirteenth Amendment as granting Congress the discretionary power to 
analyze and end impediments to civil liberties.  Congress can go much 
further than these nineteenth-century statutes by passing new statutes 
pursuant to its Enforcement Clause authority.  The policy behind civil 
rights initiatives must be predicated on contemporary sensibilities that 
do not violate the commitment to liberal equality adopted into the 
Thirteenth Amendment. 
V. CONTEMPORARY SIGNIFICANCE AND FUTURE POTENTIAL OF THE 
THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 
Recent Supreme Court decisions have limited Congress’s ability to rely 
on its traditional Fourteenth Amendment and Commerce Clause powers 
to pass civil rights legislation.  Sections A and B demonstrate that recent 
decisions have not eroded Thirteenth Amendment authority for securing 
 
both was “traceable” to section 1 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act.  Id. at 439-40. 
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the liberal equality first promised to all citizens during the Revolution, 
elaborated through abolitionists, and made part of the Constitution in 
the aftermath of the Civil War.  Section C then evaluates the extent to 
which the Thirteenth Amendment permits Congress to enforce civil 
rights. 
A. Relationship Between the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments 
1. Recent Judicial Fourteenth Amendment Approach 
Recent Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence has limited Congress’s 
ability to pursue civil rights initiatives.  The Rehnquist Court has crafted 
a “responsive,” rather than substantive, interpretation of Congress’s 
Section 5 authority.327  In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court found 
unconstitutional the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, as applied to 
state and local governments.  The Court explained that the statute was 
“so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventative object that 
it [could not] be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, 
unconstitutional behavior.”328  The case limited Congress’s Section 5 
authority to passing congruent laws for remedying state violations of 
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees:  “The Fourteenth Amendment’s 
history confirms the remedial, rather than substantive, nature of the 
Enforcement Clause.”329 
The Boerne Court based its rationale on statements made during 
congressional debates over the proposed Fourteenth Amendment to the 
effect that Congress should not be given affirmative power to make civil 
rights laws since that would intrude on powers traditionally vested in 
the states.330  Ruth Colker has researched and debunked the Court’s 
misleadingly selective reliance on speeches made by congressmen who 
opposed the Amendment’s ratification.331  The Court failed to mention 
that of the four congressmen on whose views it predicated its responsive 
reasoning in Boerne, only one supported the Fourteenth Amendment.332  
 
 327 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997). 
 328 Id. at 532 (emphasis added). 
 329 Id. at 520. 
 330 Id. at 520-21. 
 331 See Ruth Colker, The Supreme Court’s Historical Errors in City of Boerne v. Flores, 43 
B.C. L. REV. 783, 797-817 (2002). 
 332 See id. at 792.  Specifically, in Boerne the Court quoted Representatives Hale, 
Hotchkiss, and Rogers and Senator Stewart.  Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520-21.  “Of the 
Representatives quoted by the Court, only Representative Hotchkiss voted for ratification 
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Relying on the understanding of ratification opponents to bolster 
constitutional interpretation is a dubious method of judicial 
interpretation, particularly if the method claims to adhere to the framers’ 
original intent. 
The Court reiterated this remedial interpretation in Kimel v. Florida 
Board of Regents, finding that Congress overstepped its Section 5 
enforcement authority by extending the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act’s applicability to state and local governments.333  The 
Court held the statute’s breach of state sovereign immunity to be “out of 
proportion to its supposed remedial or preventive objectives.”334  Other 
cases dealing with Section 5 have applied this responsive 
“proportionality and congruency” test to the Patent Remedy Act,335 the 
Violence Against Women Act,336 the Americans with Disabilities Act,337 
and the Family and Medical Leave Act.338 
2. Comparing Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment Powers 
Both the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments contain enforcement 
provisions for enacting federal laws that protect liberty and equality 
interests essential to the general welfare.  They are based on a civil rights 
tradition grounded in revolutionary assertions of liberty against the 
British yoke of slavery and radical abolitionist goals of using the 
Constitution to end chattel servitude and all its associated practices.  
Union victory in the Civil War heralded, in President Lincoln’s words, “a 
new birth of freedom.”339  That nascent hope for change was partly 
embodied in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.  These 
amendments were passed to provide all Americans, regardless of their 
race, with the equal opportunity to live self-directed lives.340  The two 
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amendments differ, however, in scope and application.  These 
differences are significant for formulating civil rights policy. 
The Fourteenth Amendment’s state action requirement, for instance, 
sets limits on what discriminatory conduct Congress can regulate.  The 
Supreme Court has narrowly construed the applicability of the 
Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since the Civil Rights 
Cases.  The Thirteenth Amendment, on the other hand has no such 
limitation on statutory authority.  Boerne took the state action 
requirement for granted341 and even further straightjacketed Congress by 
finding that Section 5 allows it “to enforce” but not “to determine what 
constitutes a constitutional violation.”342  The Supreme Court also 
embraced the Fourteenth Amendment’s state action requirement in 
United States v. Morrison.343  Writing for the majority, Justice William 
Rehnquist explained that the Court would not deviate from “the time-
honored principle that the Fourteenth Amendment, by its very terms, 
prohibits only state action.”344  Morrison claimed that it was based on the 
doctrine of stare decisis and the “insight attributable to the Members of 
the Court at that time,” since they had “intimate knowledge and 
familiarity with the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.”345 
Statutes passed pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment, on the other 
hand, need not concern themselves with state actors.  While the 
American Revolution was against state-sponsored tyranny perpetrated 
by agents of the British government, abolitionists used the founding 
generation’s broad notions of liberty in their advocacy against private 
actors who owned slaves or facilitated the institution of slavery.  The 
Thirteenth Amendment prohibits slavery regardless of whether it is 
practiced by state actors or private parties and irrespective of whether it 
is legally tolerated or unlawfully perpetrated.  The Civil Rights Cases 
recognized that Congress can criminalize private discrimination though 
its Thirteenth Amendment enforcement powers.  Decades later, the 
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Warren and Burger Courts, in Jones v. Mayer and Runyan v. McCrary 
respectively, confirmed that the Thirteenth Amendment enables 
Congress to pass criminal and civil laws against private party 
defendants.346  Thus, civil rights laws passed under congressional 
Thirteenth Amendment authority can enjoin innumerable private acts 
that the Fourteenth Amendment does not reach. 
The Thirteenth Amendment has the further advantage of providing 
the authority for unequivocal regulation that need not be responsive.  
The Fourteenth Amendment, however, has a “responsive” role, 
according to the most recent line of cases.  In Boerne, the Court found that 
Congress could not choose to act unless it was responding to 
unconstitutional behavior.347  Again, in Kimel, the Court held that 
Fourteenth Amendment Section 5 power could not be used to abrogate 
sovereign immunity where there was no indication that passage of a 
statute was meant to respond to discriminatory state conduct.348 
Thirteenth Amendment-based statutes may likewise respond to 
discrimination, but they may also interpret the meaning of “liberty” in 
the Constitution and act upon it.  Pursuant to this scheme, the Court 
remains the final arbiter of what the Constitution means, but Congress 
can act on its own findings, which may be constructive and not merely 
responsive.  The Thirteenth Amendment standard of review is a low-
level, rational basis scrutiny.349  Under the Thirteenth Amendment, the 
federal legislature may, and indeed should, pass laws that are conducive 
for autonomy to thrive. 
Such a perspective should not merely be confined to currently existing 
statutes.  Congress may pass civil legislation more sensitive to human 
rights concerns than the property-centered sections 1981 and 1982.  
Congress’s enforcement power under the Thirteenth Amendment not 
only aims to prevent interference with fundamental rights, which is the 
extent of Congress’s authority under the Fourteenth Amendment,350 but 
 
 346 Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 , 176 (1976); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 
409, 429-30 (1968). 
 347 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532. 
 348 Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 86 (2000) (“[J]udged against the backdrop 
of our equal protection jurisprudence, it is clear that the ADEA is ‘so out of proportion to a 
supposed remedial or preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or 
designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.’” (quoting Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532)). 
 349 See Jones, 392 U.S. at 440. 
 350 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[A]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside.  No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
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also enables the federal government to actualize the ideals of the 
Declaration of Independence and the Preamble. 
B. Thirteenth Amendment and Commerce Clause 
1. Pre-Lopez Commerce Clause Approach 
Besides making it more difficult for Congress to achieve civil rights 
reform through the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court has placed new 
constraints on traditional Commerce Clause power.  Prior to Lopez in 
1995, Congress virtually had plenary power to pass laws that were 
rationally related to the national economy.351  The wave of judicial 
deference, which began during the New Deal, crested during the 1960s 
when Congress passed a series of civil rights statutes, most notably the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, pursuant to its Commerce Clause authority.352  
The Warren Court supported Congress’s creative strategy for 
circumnavigating around the eighty-year-old state action restrictions in 
United States v. Harris353 and the Civil Rights Cases.354  Civil rights leaders, 
just as their legislative allies, thought that the federal government should 
 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).  The Court first connected 
governmental interference with the Privileges and Immunities Clause in the Slaughter-
House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872).  The Court found that the Clause only protected citizens 
from state interference with the privileges and immunities of national, but not state, 
citizenship.  Id. at 61-62.  Likewise, the Equal Protection Clause prevents the government’s 
interference with the exercise of fundamental rights “unless it is supported by sufficiently 
important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests.”  See, e.g.,  
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978).  “The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause has a substantive component that ‘provides heightened protection against 
government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests’ . . . .”  Troxel 
v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 57 (2000) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 
(1997)). 
 351 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 118-29 (1942) (upholding Agricultural 
Adjustment Act of 1938 because family farm consumption had cumulative effect on 
national wheat market).  United States v. Lopez did not overrule Wickard, but called it “the 
most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity.”  United 
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995). 
 352 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 28 and 42 U.S.C.). 
 353 106 U.S. 629 (1883) (invalidating Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13, 
which punished private conspiracies). 
 354 109 U.S. 3, 11-12 (1883) (holding that Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment Section 5 
enforcement powers are limited to state action); see also Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 
(1880) (stating that Fourteenth Amendment provisions “all have reference to State action 
exclusively, and not to any action of private individuals”). 
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make private discrimination actionable in federal courts.355  The Supreme 
Court, under the leadership of Chief Justice Earl Warren, relied on the 
Commerce Clause to find the Civil Rights Act of 1964 constitutional 
rather than overturn post-Reconstruction jurisprudence that established 
the Fourteenth Amendment state action requirement. 
Some of the most important cases establishing the standard of review 
for evaluating the constitutionality of civil rights laws arose under Title 
II of the Act, which enjoins private businesses from withholding public 
services on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.356  Heart 
of Atlanta Motel v. United States, a 1964 watershed case, determined that 
Congress could prevent a motel from racist interference with the 
interstate travel of black patrons wanting to rent a room.357  Without 
second-guessing the extent of congressional findings, the Court 
determined that the Senate and House made a rational enactment in light 
of overwhelming evidence that hotels and motels were obstructing 
interstate commerce.358  That same year, the Court found in Katzenbach v. 
McClung that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 constitutionally prohibited a 
family-owned restaurant from discriminating against potential 
patrons.359  In that case, the Court explicitly stated that Congress was not 
required to make any formal findings as to the economic effect of 
legislation passed pursuant to the Commerce Clause.360  These cases were 
based on the de minimis review of interstate commerce regulations that, 
in Wickard v. Filburn, had even upheld a federal law that applied to 
privately-grown wheat intended for private consumption.361 
 
 355 Many people, including Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy and constitutional 
scholars like Gerald Gunther, counseled Civil Rights leaders to use the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  However, the Solicitor General Archibald Cox understood that without 
overruling the Civil Rights Cases, such a suggestion was a nonstarter.  Seth P. Waxman, 
Twins At Birth:  Civil Rights and the Role of the Solicitor General, 75 IND. L.J. 1297, 1312 (2000).  
Since stare decisis indicated that the likelihood of overruling the 1883 decision was small, 
Cox convinced the President to follow the Commerce Clause strategy.  Id. 
 356 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a (West 2000).  Title II is applicable to four categories of “places”:  
(1) “establishment[s] which provid[e] lodging to transient guests,” (2) “facilit[ies] 
principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises,” (3) “place[s] of 
exhibition or entertainment,” or (4) “any establishment . . . which is physically located 
within the premises of any establishment” listed in this statute.  Id. § 2000a(b). 
 357 The Court found that the Heart of Atlanta Motel was engaged in interstate 
commerce since it advertised nationally and attracted part of its business from persons 
using interstate highways.  Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 243 
(1964). 
 358 Id. at 257. 
 359 Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 305 (1964). 
 360 Id. at  299. 
 361 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942). 
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For decades, Heart of Atlanta Motel and McClung stood for the 
deferential principle that Congress could pass any necessary laws 
rationally connected to interstate commerce.362  The Court did not second 
guess congressional fact-finding when a statute met this minimum 
threshold.363  This commitment to upholding economically predicated 
regulations extended so far that, in Daniel v. Paul, even selling hot dog 
buns at a concession stand and playing a jukebox for entertainment 
made an otherwise private club into a regulated business involved in 
interstate commerce.364  So long as the legislature did not pass a law 
based on arbitrary and concocted findings, the Court time and again 
found statutes constitutional.  Prior to 1997, the Court never categorically 
required Congress to provide evidence about the economic consequences 
leading it to enact statutes on the basis of its Commerce Clause 
prerogative.365  Such a requirement, Harold Krent argued, 
“unquestionably would fundamentally alter the relationship between the 
judiciary and the legislature.”366 
2. Rehnquist Court Commerce Clause Approach 
By the 1990s, use of the Commerce Clause was a well established 
approach to protecting civil rights.  The Court altered the dynamic of 
judicial review in United States v. Lopez, where it found unconstitutional a 
federal criminal statute prohibiting the possession of firearms near 
schools,367 and in United States v. Morrison, where it found Congress 
overstepped its authority in creating a federal civil remedy for gender-
motivated violence.368  In the name of federalism, the Court increased its 
oversight of the legislative process.369 
 
 362 Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 303-04; Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 261-62. 
 363 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 666 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]his 
Court has not previously held that Congress must document the existence of a problem in 
every State prior to proposing a national solution.”). 
 364 Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 305, 308 (1969). 
 365 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 606 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 366 Harold J. Krent, Turning Congress into an Agency:  The Propriety of Requiring Legislative 
Findings, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 731, 732-33 (1996).  For an earlier rendition of the same 
point, see Archibald Cox, Foreword:  Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human 
Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 105 (1966) (“The Court does not review the sufficiency of the 
evidence in the record to support congressional action. . . . No case has ever held that a 
record is constitutionally required.”). 
 367 In similar fashion, the Court encroached on Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment 
Section 5 authority both in Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619, and Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 
528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000). 
 368 Morrison, 529 U.S. 613-14. 
 369 A. Christopher Bryant and Timothy J. Simeone have canvassed Supreme Court 
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Rather than use the rational basis test, the Lopez Court determined that 
the Gun-Free School Zones Act was unconstitutional because it sought to 
prevent an activity that did not have a “substantial effect” on interstate 
commerce.370  Unlike the post-1937 New Deal Court, in cases like United 
State v. Darby371 and Wickard, or Warren Court interpretations, like Heart 
of Atlanta Motel and McClung, the Rehnquist Court criticized 
policymakers for not making an adequate showing that guns carried 
near schools were connected to any “economic enterprise.”372  Justice 
Stephen Breyer, dissenting in Lopez, found no basis for deviating from 
the accepted rational basis test, meaning that Congress should be able to 
regulate any activity “significantly (or substantially)” affecting national 
commerce.373  Congress’s ability to pass a law covering the use of guns, at 
least those with parts that had gone through interstate commerce, would 
have seemed more secure than its ability to pass the federal regulation 
found constitutional in Daniel, but the Rehnquist Court made an 
unambiguous shift away from Warren Court precedents. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, who wrote the majority opinion in Lopez, also 
spoke for the Court in Morrison.  Unlike the congressional record offered 
on the Gun-Free School Zones Act, Congress provided overwhelming 
information about the interstate effects of gender-motivated violence.374  
Yet, the Court rejected Congress’s policy explanation that violence 
against women substantially affects interstate commerce.375  The 
lawmakers had relied on a “mountain of data,” including information 
from no less than nine congressional hearings and reports from gender  
 
 
precedents and found that the Court’s recent trend of striking laws because of a 
purportedly inadequate congressional record “is highly questionable on precedential, 
constitutional, and practical grounds.”  A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone, 
Remanding to Congress:  The Supreme Court’s New “On the Record” Constitutional Review of 
Federal Statutes, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 328, 395 (2001). 
 370 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563. 
 371 United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
 372 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-61. 
 373 Id. at 618 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Justice Breyer pointed out that, contrary to the 
majority’s holding, Commerce Clause cases have not consistently used the “substantial 
effects” label:  “I use the word ‘significant’ because the word ‘substantial’ implies a 
somewhat narrower power than recent precedent suggests. . . . But to speak of ‘substantial 
effect’ rather than ‘significant effect’ would make no difference in this case.”  Id. at 616.  
From an opposite perspective, Justice Thomas considered the substantial effects text to be a 
virtually limitless grant of congressional power:  “We must . . . respect a constitutional line 
that does not grant Congress power over all that substantially affects interstate commerce.”  
Id. at 593 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 374 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619-20 (2000). 
 375 Id. at 614-15. 
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bias task forces in twenty-one states, which had been amassed over four 
years.376 
The Court disregarded the compiled data, finding the Violence 
Against Women Act unconstitutional because gender-motivated crimes 
“are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity.”377  The 
reassessment of congressional evidence was reminiscent of Lochner-era 
substantive due process review.378  Gender-motivated violence, the Court 
found, “not directed at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods 
involved in interstate commerce has always been the province of the 
States.”379  The Court concluded that Congress may not regulate conduct 
solely based on its “aggregate effect on interstate commerce,” but only 
on the basis of either the defendant’s effect on the national economy or 
the activity’s economic nature.380 
The new line of Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment cases 
has created a problem for civil rights activists.  It threatens to slow the 
legislative process by making data gathering cost-prohibitive and 
potentially futile, given that the Court can now disregard the quantity 
and quality of Congress’s findings by invoking constitutional-sounding 
language.  Neither can Congress identify which constitutional rights it 
can protect without the Court’s prior guidance.  Given these constraints 
on legislative powers, civil rights leaders need to develop a strategy for 
enforcing civil rights that can avoid these new hurdles. 
3. Distinguishing the Thirteenth Amendment from the Commerce 
Clause 
The recent developments in Commerce Clause cases indicate that there 
are significant obstacles to relying on congressional authority over 
interstate commerce to develop a legislative civil rights approach.  
Statutes passed to end arbitrary discrimination and relying on 
Commerce Clause authority remain vulnerable to counterarguments 
 
 376 Id. at 628-31 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 377 Id. at 613 (majority opinion). 
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 379 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-18. 
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about their effect on the national economy.  Federal laws relying on the 
Thirteenth Amendment, on the other hand, deal primarily with conduct 
rationally related to oppressive control, not interstate commerce. 
Abolitionists sought and achieved an end to all slavery, not only the type 
that could be reasonably linked to the interstate economy.  The 
Thirteenth Amendment even prohibits involuntary servitude occurring 
entirely within one state and having absolutely no economic benefit to 
slaveholders.  For instance, the keeping of a sex slave would be 
egregious even if the kept person were never taken out of state nor used 
for any material gain. 
While economic arguments can be of little consequence to policies 
based on the Thirteenth Amendment, they can be dispositive when it 
comes to civil rights legislation predicated on the Commerce Clause.  
The Court’s determination in Morrison that misogynistic violence has no 
substantial effect on national commerce is irrelevant to evaluating 
whether the Thirteenth Amendment grants Congress the power to 
prevent such violence.  The Jones rational basis inquiry has never been 
altered in the way that Lopez and Morrison altered Commerce Clause 
analysis.  Had Congress relied on its Thirteenth Amendment 
enforcement power in passing the Violence Against Women Act, the 
Court  might have deferred to legislators as long as they had found that 
gender-motivated violence was rationally analogous to arbitrary 
domination and that the statute was a necessary and proper means of 
dealing with it.  The only question left for the Court would have been 
whether the statutory means chosen by Congress were “reasonably 
adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution.”381 
Another advantage of the Thirteenth Amendment is its unequivocal 
stand against despotism that goes back to the philosophy that 
revolutionaries included in the Declaration of Independence and the 
Constitution’s Preamble.  The Commerce Clause, on the other hand, is a 
morally-neutral provision that could just as readily be used in a slave 
society as in a liberal republic.  Its history bears this out.  Even though by 
1824 the Court, in Gibbons v. Ogden,382 determined that Congress had the 
power to regulate any commerce between states, slavery continued 
unabated and exploited interstate commercial outlets.  One can even find 
indications from debates of the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention 
that the Commerce Clause was part of the founders’ compromise with 
 
 381 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 262 (1964) (explaining use 
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the slave states.383  Even though the Clause presumably granted Congress 
the power to regulate the slave trade between states, the national 
government tolerated the practice, and some antebellum congressmen 
even owned slaves.384 
By its very terms, the Thirteenth Amendment is not given to a neutral 
reading on the subject of private- or state-sponsored discrimination.  The 
Congressional debates leading to the Amendment’s ratification referred 
often to the unfulfilled vision of the nation’s founders.  There is nothing 
neutral about a constitutional provision containing a moral stance 
against the exploitation of human lives.  Understanding the Supreme 
Court’s holding on Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment power by 
filtering regulations through the broad definition of “slavery” provides 
an understanding of what the Amendment stands for.  It provides 
Congress with the means to continue the work of the Reconstruction 
Congress, using contemporary sensibilities to understand what 
fundamental rights the national government can protect.  This does not 
mean that a Thirteenth Amendment civil rights approach should 
displace Commerce Clause efforts under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  
Rather, it brings into bold relief the continued vitality of Jones in 
establishing Congress’s broad interpretive power at a time when Lopez 
and Morrison have made the passage of new civil rights legislation under 
the Commerce Clause more onerous. 
C. Construing Thirteenth Amendment Liberty:  How Far Might It Extend? 
The ideas of the Thirteenth Amendment’s framers, while invaluable, 
cannot be the endpoint of construction.  Its framers were men of their 
time whose social and political backgrounds made them incapable of 
foreseeing every potential application of the Amendment.  Their ideas 
and those of their abolitionist mentors are nevertheless essential for 
comprehending the Amendment’s significance to contemporary 
incidents of involuntary servitude, such as the forced sex trade, the 
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sign of “bad faith of the American people”); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr. & Grant S. Nelson, A 
Critique of the Narrow Interpretation of the Commerce Clause, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 695, 702 n.54 
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exploitation of domestic workers, and the peonage of migrant farmers.385  
Judicial opinion is likewise essential for formulating a constructive 
interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment.  Historical and 
precedential examination, when supplemented with normative analysis, 
is useful to establish the constitutional limitations of congressional 
power.386 
Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment grants Congress the 
enforcement power to effectuate the moral principles of the Preamble to 
the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence.  In this regard, 
the Thirteenth Amendment was both a new beginning for the nation and 
a constructive means for enforcing its foundational principles of liberty 
and general well-being. 
The Thirteenth Amendment was a drastic break from the clauses of the 
1787 Constitution that protected slavery.  Section 2 of the Amendment 
expanded the federal government’s ability to protect individuals by 
granting Congress the power to protect civil liberties, rather than rely on 
states to do so.  The Thirteenth Amendment is the bridge between a 
Constitution beholden to the aristocratic practices of slavocracy and one 
committed to coequal liberty.  The Amendment, thereby, secured the 
Preamble’s principled grant of governmental power.  It protects the right 
of unobtrusive autonomy to carry out deliberative decisions, limiting 
autonomy whenever it arbitrarily interferes with the reasonable 
purposes of other citizens.  The assurance of freedom protects dignity 
rights as long as they do not infringe the equal liberty rights of others.  
This approach balances autonomy with welfare to achieve a liberating 
sense of mutual purpose for congressional initiatives. 
The second section of the Thirteenth Amendment also provides an 
enforceable national guarantee of freedom that is not subject to state 
prerogative.  Federal legislative power is available against any form of 
arbitrary domination.  The scheme protects more than the freedoms 
enumerated in the Bill of Rights and extends to any intrinsic freedom, 
such as the ability to freely travel between states.  Fair civil rights 
initiatives must balance individual liberties against the national interests 
of a diverse but equally free people.  The Enforcement Clause of the 
Thirteenth Amendment provides lawmakers with the power to craft 
laws that are tied to the Declaration of Independence’s vision of a free 
 
 385 For a contemporary instance of involuntary servitude, see TSESIS, supra note 118, at 
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and equal citizenry.  The framers of the Thirteenth Amendment, under 
the influence of abolitionist theorists, determined that liberty was a 
national right and provided the federal government with the 
constitutional authority to secure it against all racist discrimination. 
Importantly, the Supreme Court has extended the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s applicability to coercive acts committed against members 
of any race, not only against blacks.  In the years following the 
Amendment’s ratification, Radical Republicans passed civil rights 
legislation, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Ku Klux Klan Act 
of 1871, to protect their black and white allies.387  The risk to missionaries, 
teachers, and politicians who came to the South after the Civil War was 
almost as great as the danger blacks faced from mob violence.388  Since 
then, a variety of cases have defined who can bring suit under legislation 
promulgated pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment.  In the Slaughter-
House Cases, the Court held that the Amendment applies to “Mexican 
peonage and the Chinese coolie labor system.”389  Even though “race” is a 
fluid term, the Supreme Court later held that contemporary racial 
classifications should not constrict the Amendment’s applicability.  In 
Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, a 1987 case arising from the private 
desecration of a synagogue, the Court found that when Congress passed 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Jews and Arabs were among the groups 
classified as distinct races.390  The Court, therefore, concluded that the 
Act prevents property discrimination reminiscent of servitude from 
being committed against Jews and Arabs.391 
The Amendment’s protections apply to anyone who is subject to 
arbitrary restraints on the enjoyment of freedom.  The Abolition 
Amendment freed slaves from much more than their obligation to 
engage in unrequited labor.  A constricted understanding of its purposes 
would be ahistorical:  The country’s framers understood that there were 
different gradations of slavery — a variety of infringements on equal 
liberty that were incidental to chattel servitude.  The Thirteenth 
Amendment prohibits full-blown slavery as well as conduct depriving 
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individuals of the fundamental rights that catalyzed the American 
Revolution.  The Reconstruction Congress made the protection of those 
rights against state prejudices obligatory on the country.  Following the 
ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, the Declaration and Preamble 
were no longer aspirational statements but enforceable aims that 
provided guidance and placed the primary onus for civil rights on the 
federal government. 
The Thirteenth Amendment ended all practices incidental of servitude, 
including arbitrary limitations on association, travel, and employment. 392  
The Thirteenth Amendment, inferentially, prohibited all repressive 
conduct rationally related to the impediments of freedom, not simply 
racist labor practices.  Congress is empowered to act against the arbitrary 
restraint of freedom, and its enactments are subject to rational level 
judicial review. 
Statutes should protect free and equal persons’ rights to pursue 
qualitatively good lives.  Masters had suppressed slaves’ aspirations, 
prohibiting them from entering into marital contracts, from choosing 
professions, from learning to read, and from making a host of other 
important life decisions.  Slavery devalued the Preamble’s governmental 
commitment to freedom.  Consequently, laws that are passed under 
Section 2 must make it easier for people to express their individuality 
and must prevent arbitrarily domineering private and state actions. 
The Thirteenth Amendment requires that the federal legislature and 
judiciary provide the security necessary for citizens to direct their lives 
pursuant to unique plans, relationships, and interests.  Slavery denies 
persons the opportunity to creatively engage with the world by 
restricting their right to pursue professions, choose how to raise their 
children, and make reasonable choices among an infinite variety of 
domestic options.  A free society allows persons to make plans for their 
lives rather than externally necessitating them to act on undesired 
alternatives.  Becoming a carpenter because of an interest in the craft is 
significantly different from having no option but to choose that trade.  
Teaching one’s own children only English differs from being prohibited 
from teaching them foreign languages.  Living in a predominantly 
Jewish neighborhood by choice is different than being forbidden from 
living elsewhere. 
The Thirteenth Amendment shifts the balance of authority for 
protecting these civil rights away from states and in favor of the national 
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government.  One of the federal government’s primary functions is to 
protect the common good — laws must aim to pragmatically improve 
people’s lives and to help them flourish as self-directed individuals.  The 
coequal freedoms of self-determination and self-realization are 
conducive to the overall good of U.S. society.  Laws that require citizens 
to deal fairly can reduce individual conflicts and thereby increase social 
tranquility.  Thus, a policy designed to promote liberty as a means of 
achieving the common good has an antidiscriminatory principle built 
into it:  one cannot arbitrarily restrict another’s liberty and credibly insist 
that such an act benefits everyone. 
Civil liberties are not absolute; rather, they may be limited by the 
rights of others.  People living in an organized society may not exercise 
their liberty to intentionally cause more than a trivial amount of harm to 
others.  The Thirteenth Amendment is not a right for license but rather 
for independence of choice.  It does not sanction indiscriminate behavior 
that disregards the rights of others.  Instead, it provides a national 
commitment to provide legal redress for arbitrary constraints on 
independent and unobtrusive choices.393  The Thirteenth Amendment 
prevents the exploitation of personal liberty that interferes with others’ 
legitimate pursuits.  This constraint on the Amendment’s significance 
derives from slavers’ abuse of freedom.  After all, masters had abused 
their property right to possess and sell slaves.  The Amendment ended 
this domineering perspective of constitutional liberty because its 
implementation denied the Declaration’s and Preamble’s assurances to a 
host of persons for whom the drive for a good life was just as 
fundamental as it was for their tormentors.  The Amendment was meant 
to counteract that abuse of power by enabling Congress to prohibit any 
abridgments on people’s rights to be self-directed and self-motivated.  
This conclusion follows not only from the theoretical construct of liberty 
but also from the denigrating nature of the master-servant relationship. 
Laws based on the Thirteenth Amendment should safeguard the right 
of citizens to live meaningful lives unobstructed by acts of arbitrary 
domination.  In drafting civil rights bills, legislators should assess any 
remaining arbitrary infringements on the meaningful assertion of 
individual and group liberties.  Congress’s task is dynamic, requiring it 
to evaluate contemporary circumstances and to craft vigorous responses 
to modern or ancient forms of discrimination. 
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Federal laws against such practices should be drafted in ways that 
would best benefit all citizens, rather than a particular interest group.394  
The nation rises or falls as a whole.  The Thirteenth Amendment makes 
available to all the full enjoyment of the rights essential to a free society.  
It does not take for granted that each person will act with reciprocal 
concern and respect for fellow citizens.  Instead, the Thirteenth 
Amendment grants Congress the power to enact laws against arbitrary 
domination.  By securing personal safety and stability, the Amendment 
protects the nation’s citizenry against whimsical coercion.  Judicial 
review serves to prevent congressional power from being hijacked for 
autocratic purposes. 
Congress has thus far done little to fulfill its legislative obligation to 
liberty rights under the Thirteenth Amendment, and only a handful of 
cases interpret congressional power.  Congress’s failure to act has 
reduced the Amendment’s effectiveness but not its enormous potential 
for change.  In spite of more than a century of virtual neglect, the 
congressional authority to pass a variety of civil rights laws remains 
viably intact. 
CONCLUSION 
The Enforcement Clause of the Thirteenth Amendment grants Congress 
the power to provide for the general welfare by protecting civil liberties.  
The ideology of Revolutionary founders and abolitionists exerted a 
profound effect on the Amendment’s proponents.  Abolitionist 
perspectives about the Declaration of Independence and the Preamble 
influenced Radical Republicans in their decision to pass a comprehensive 
constitutional amendment for the national protection of liberty.  For the 
Amendment’s framers, the concept of slavery, and its concomitant 
harms, was nearly as broad as that notion was for Revolutionaries and 
abolitionists. 
The Reconstruction Congress developed the Thirteenth Amendment 
into a far-reaching guaranty of any fundamental right essential to human 
liberty.  Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment aims to provide 
legislators with the means for implementing protections of fundamental 
liberties, such as the rights to travel and to marry.  Today Section 2 still 
empowers Congress to reflect on contemporary conditions that are 
analogous to involuntary servitude and slavery and to pass federal 
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legislation to meet civil rights ends. 
In the years following the Civil War, the Supreme Court rejected a 
comprehensive reading of liberty in favor of a narrow understanding 
that was more closely linked to the Amendment’s opponents than to its 
supporters.395  The Supreme Court subscribed to this narrow 
interpretation for many years.  The Court eventually changed course, 
realizing that the Amendment grants Congress the right to prevent many 
obstructions to freedom, such as discriminatory contractual practices, 
that are not literally connected to forced labor.  Despite the Court’s 
recognition of broad congressional authority to define the incidents and 
badges of involuntary servitude, Congress has rarely exercised its 
enforcement power under the Thirteenth Amendment.  Notwithstanding 
this oversight the Amendment offers a wealth of possibilities for 
enacting civil rights legislation predicated on the nation’s historic 
commitment to liberal equality. 
Using its Thirteenth Amendment power, Congress can deal with such 
nationwide harms as hate crimes,396 hate speech directed against 
identifiable groups,397 and oppressive labor practices.398  The Thirteenth 
Amendment’s national guarantee of freedom is a powerful alternative to 
the Fourteenth Amendment and Commerce Clause for passing civil 
rights legislation.  That alternative has taken on greater import since the 
Rehnquist Court reduced congressional effectiveness under the 
Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  To  
achieve the goal of coequal liberty, Congress may use its Thirteenth 
Amendment Enforcement Clause power to pass statutes against private 
and public discrimination. 
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